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 With approximately 90% of the world’s goods shipped via cargo containers, it is vital for 
the security of these containers to be complete and effective. However, given the volume of 
containers transiting U.S. seaports, the task of providing subsequent security is complicated and, 
arguably, improbable. Nevertheless, the data analyzed throughout this study disputes that the 
current cargo container paradigm can be enhanced to accommodate the significant workload. 
 The research conducted throughout this study provided perceptions that were indicative 
of a security environment that could be and must be improved. More specifically, the data 
revealed that the biggest threat facing containers was their susceptibility to be exploited for 
smuggling purposes. In addition, all of the participants acknowledged the use of a layered 
security framework at their respective ports. However, this “layered” approach was insufficient 
to scan even a fraction of the containers imported to the U.S. As a result of the limitations 
associated with container security, the majority of containers receive no form of inspection until 
their arrival to U.S. seaports. This makes it impossible to inspect and, even, scan 100% of 
containers. With that in mind, the participants in this study believe that container security could 
progress, but without knowledgeable, proper and efficient use of technology, no such 
improvement is achievable. Furthermore, unilateral cooperation from the rest of the global 
seaport community is essential for container security to advance. Finally, the insurmountable 
task of providing a dynamic and resilient security framework hinges on CBP’s ability to facilitate 
and collaborate with the entire seaport community.  
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1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Almost 90 percent of the world’s manufactured goods move by container, much of it 
stacked many stories high on huge container ships (“Container Security Initiative,” 2008). 
Furthermore, of over the 100 million containers moved through the maritime transport system in 
2005, about 11 million arrived and were offloaded at domestic seaports in the United States 
(“Container Security Initiative,” 2008). Due to the large volume of cargo, containers have 
become the most significant threat to maritime transportation. 
Prior to the advent of containers, cargo such as fruit, textiles and coffee was boxed or 
stacked loose or on pallets in hatches below decks and loaded and unloaded via conveyor belts, 
physical manpower, ship cranes, or nets (McNicholas, 2008). Now, specialty containers have 
been constructed to handle nearly all cargoes from toxic chemicals, to airplane parts, to 
automobiles, to hanging garments, bagged sugar and grains, case lots, as well as a huge variety 
of refrigerated and frozen products (McNicholas, 2008). 
McNicholas (2008) explained:  
The development of the modern container—the most efficient, safe, and flexible method 
to transport cargo across the ocean and land—was a watershed event in maritime 
transportation and served as a catalyst for the evolution of seaports from only handling 
break bulk and bulk cargoes and vessels to also—or exclusively—receiving and loading 
cargo containers. (p.34) 
2Primarily, commercial vessels are responsible for transporting cargo containers. And today, 
approximately 90% of cargo transported around the world is by way of commercial vessel and 
93% of its packaged in containers (Kaluza, Kolzsch, Gastner & Blasius, 2010). McNicholas 
(2008) defined a container as a closed or open top van or other similar body on or into which 
cargo is loaded and transported without chassis aboard ocean vessels. Furthermore, containers 
come in various sizes and types to accommodate a variety of goods such as dry, refrigerated, and 
liquid and do not have their own wheels (“World Shipping Council,” 2011). 
The effects of container shipping have proven paramount to the progressive and efficient 
flow of global trade. The evolution of commercial shipping reached a profound echelon with the 
introduction of the cargo container. The modern container first appeared in the 1950s (“World 
Shipping Council,” 2011). On April 26, 1956, a crane lifted fifty-eight aluminum truck bodies 
aboard an aging tanker ship moored in Newark, New Jersey (Levinson, 2006). Five days later 
the Ideal-X sailed into Houston, where fifty-eight trucks waited to take on the metal boxes and 
haul them to their destinations. Such was the beginning of a revolution (Levinson, 2006). 
However, Publicover (1999) argued that the U.S. military was the first to experiment with the 
use of containers for shipping in the mid 1960’s. Nevertheless, this advancement created an 
entirely new paradigm for the transportation of cargo. Yet, with all the benefits this 
advancement generated for maritime cargo transportation, it invented new vulnerabilities that 
were susceptible to exploitation. 
In the early years of containerization, very little emphasis was put on standardization 
(McNicholas, 2008). Containers came in various sizes. As a result, McLean’s, Sea-Land Service 
typically used a 35 foot container, while Matson Lines, which sailed between the West Coast of 
the United States and Hawaii, decided on 24-foot long containers (McNicholas, 2008). 
However, it wasn’t until 1970, at the urging of McLean, that some standards were proposed and 
3adopted by the International Standards Organization (ISO), with the 20 and 40 footers becoming 
the basic units (Schuler, 2008).
While there are several versions/dimensions associated with the modern shipping 
container, most commonly they either are 20 or 40 feet long, eight feet wide, and eight feet six 
inches in height (Department of Transportation, 2010). The 20 foot containers, or twenty foot 
equivalents (TEUs), are more widely used. Moreover, the aforementioned standardization has 
made it possible to ship enormous amounts of containers on a single load/deck. Some SuperMax 
vessels can transport over 14,000 TEUs at one time. For example, the M/V EMMA MAERSK 
regularly carries up to 11,000 TEU containers to a designated seaport, discharge a portion of 
their containers, and reload as planned (McNicholas, 2008). Furthermore, MAERSK plans to 
have a larger container ship built by 2013, which will be capable of transporting approximately 
18,000 TEUs (Martin, 2011). For further information see Table 3A: What is a TEU? 
Threats to Containers 
 However, this commercial advantage has increased the likelihood of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) successfully penetrating maritime security and, subsequently, entering the 
United States undetected. More specifically, it has been argued that a cargo container would be 
the most likely way to secrete such a weapon. Nevertheless, with the millions of containers 
shipped globally, the ability of criminals and terrorists to exploit this means of transportation has 
become an overwhelming concern. Additional threats include: stowaways, piracy, drug and 
contraband smuggling, sabotage, hijacking, unauthorized use, cargo tampering, hostage-taking, 
vandalism, use of the vessel to carry perpetrators and their equipment, and the use of the vessel 
as a weapon (McNicholas, 2008). 
4 These threats are determined by an individual’s ability to successfully manipulate the 
containers themselves.  Such issues concerning the integrity and, inevitably, exploitation of 
container security begin with the physical characteristics of cargo containers. It is inconceivable 
to monitor all cargo once it has been loaded aboard a shipping vessel. Sweet (2006) explained 
physical and procedural security needs to be constantly monitored to provide a sufficient level of 
security commensurate with the current threat environment. Therefore, certain precautions have 
been established in order to mitigate this impediment.   
 For example, once containers have been loaded and stacked, a container seal is attached. 
These seals are virtually the only physical line of defense for the container. However, container 
seals are not locks. McNicholas (2008) elaborates, while a seal may have several characteristics 
of a lock—material used in the manufacture of the device, sturdiness, etc.—its primary purpose 
is as a tamper-evident device and not to prevent unauthorized access. In addition, container doors 
can be removed and replaced without breaking the seal and radio frequency identification 
(RFID) seals can be reset after unauthorized openings (Pinto & Rabadi, 2008). Furthermore, high 
security cable seals can be defeated in under 10 minutes by using a common drill and a coat 
hanger—and, with the use of a bit of green plastic fill, leaves no sign of alteration and is reusable 
(McNicholas, 2008) 
 The inspection process for containers begins well before cargo is ever loaded. Empty 
containers are inspected in container yards, port terminals and at the cargo loading location. For 
the most part, this inspection is conducted by personnel and/or K-9 teams (McNicholas, 2008). 
According to the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (2006) (C-TPAT) container 
integrity must be maintained to protect against the introduction of unauthorized material and/or 
persons. Procedures must be in place to verify the physical integrity of the container structure 
prior to stuffing, to include the reliability of the locking mechanisms of the doors (C-TPAT, 
52006). There is a seven-point inspection process that is recommended for all containers: Front 
wall, left side, right side, ceiling/roof, inside/outside doors, outside/undercarriage (C-TPAT, 
2006). However, the integrity of a container during its transport from point A to point B in the 
logistics chain cannot be guaranteed. Given sufficient time, opportunity and a remote location, 
people will be able to open a container and tamper with its contents (van de Voort, O’Brien, 
Rahman and Valeri, 2003).
 However, although the majority of containers are transported by sea, containerized cargo 
is conveyed utilizing multiple modes of transportation including air and ground resources (i.e. 
rail road and truck). For instance, once a container has been off-loaded at the port of entry, the 
container will, ultimately, proceed to the distributor and consumer by way of rail road and truck. 
Nevertheless, while all modes of transportation have specific vulnerabilities to warfare, criminal 
and terrorist attacks, perhaps no sector is more dangerously exposed than ports and intermodal 
freight transportation systems to which they are connected (McNicholas, 2008).
 Also, there is an inherent tension between commerce and security. This tension can make 
scanning significant numbers of containers upon destination in port a cumbersome process. The 
uninterrupted flow of commerce is directly related to container security. More specifically, the 
efficient facilitation of container security dictates the fluctuation of product pricing. Bakshi, 
Flynn and Gans (2009) noted the extra delays would lead to increases in transportation lead 
times, resulting in higher inventory levels in supply chains, and ultimately in higher cost for 
consumers. Establishing a medium that mitigates maritime threats while decreasing the inherent 
tension between commerce and container security is the most effective way to move forward. 
However, initiating a solution that satisfies all of these requirements becomes extremely 
complicated and expensive. 
6For the aforementioned reasons, seaports and, more specifically, containerized cargo are 
extremely susceptible to exploitation. In fiscal year 2006, more than 11.6 million maritime 
containers arrived at United States seaports, an average of 32,000 a day (“Container Security 
Initiative,” 2008). More importantly, only a small fraction of these containers will be checked 
and inspected by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for WMDs or other contraband.  Hall 
(2006) noted that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security is responsible for security at more 
than 140 U.S. seaports. Additionally, Hall’s (2006) research noted that DHS has only 69 mobile 
gamma ray trucks and enough drive-through radiation detectors to check 37% of the millions of 
cargo containers that arrive at the ports each year. Only 6% of those containers are ever 
physically inspected. More specifically, at the Port of Newark, NJ, about 7% to 8% of the 5,000 
containers that arrive each day are deemed “high risk” and examined by gamma ray truck 
(mobile VACIS unit that utilizes a low level gamma ray radiation source to penetrate vehicles 
and cargo). Of those, approximately 20 a day are given a complete inspection (Hall, 2006, p. 2). 
Nonetheless, given the fundamental design that is associated with international seaports, a single 
proven method could be utilized at multiple seaports. 
Primary Agencies Involved in Container Security 
The maritime sector, by its very nature is a complex, international, open transportation 
network, poses several additional challenges from a security standpoint (McNicholas, 2008). 
Therefore, effective container inspection is necessary to provide a sufficient blanket of security 
capable of meeting these demands.  Even though container security has just recently received 
more attention than decades past, container safety and security has long been considered a 
critical aspect in the overall security of seaports. For example, The International Convention for 
7Safe Containers (1972) explained, “The container itself emerged as the most important aspect to 
be considered within maritime transportation” (p.1).  
 To accomplish the abovementioned objectives, many conventions and committees have 
assembled for this purpose. Among those primary organizations presiding over these procedures 
is the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP, as well as other contributing agencies (i.e. 
Harbor Police, local municipality, state and other federal agencies). Aside from the physical 
security of the container itself, the USCG is the lead agency for port security. The U.S. 
Department of Transportation (2005) explained the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars 
(NVIC) 9-02 tasked the USCG with five (5) main goals: a) build Maritime Domain Awareness 
(MDA), b) ensure positive/controlled movement of High Interest Vessels, c) enhance presence 
and response capabilities, d) protect critical infrastructure and enhance Coast Guard force 
protection, and e) increase domestic and international outreach. However, the USCG has 
questioned their ability to handle this responsibility single-handedly.   
 The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Thomas H. Collins, has admitted that the 
agency currently does not have the resources or personnel to scrutinize the security plans of more 
than 10,000 foreign vessels that enter U.S. ports annually (U.S. Department of Transportation, 
2005). It will take cooperation between local and global organizations to alleviate this strain. 
Coordination between the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Maritime Administration, the 
CBP, local and state authorities, and international partners will be essential (Sweet, 2006). 
Previous Initiatives and Actions Taken 
 Subsequent to 9/11 and passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act, numerous 
security measures have been initiated to enhance container and port security. In November of 
2001 the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) was created in direct response 
8to 9/11. C-TPAT (2006) stated CBP challenged the trade community to partner with them to 
design a new approach to supply chain security focused on protecting the United States against 
acts of terrorism by improving security while simultaneously speeding the flow of commerce. 
Not long after C-TPAT was passed, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was 
created.  MTSA is the U.S. equivalent of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
(ISPS), and it was signed in 2002, but not fully implemented until July 1, 2004 (McNicholas, 
2008). MTSA integrates the myriad of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies tasked 
with securing the international borders of the United States and its seaports (Sweet, 2006). 
Further, McNicholas (2008) noted MTSA requires vessels and port facilities to conduct 
vulnerability assessments and develop security plans that may include security patrols, personnel 
identification procedures, access control measures, and/or installation of surveillance equipment, 
etc.
 In addition to C-TPAT and MTSA and in order to specifically improve maritime 
container security, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) was 
enacted in October 2006 and requires, among other things, that the CBP conduct a pilot program 
to determine the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers (GAO, 2008a, p. 
11). However, the ability to scan 100% of all in-bound cargo has been seen as an unattainable 
goal. Such a justification further reveals the importance of conducive relationships and, 
ultimately, “total” port security.  
One way to initiate a form of total port security is through the articulation of technology. 
Technology has been described as a force multiplier. Undoubtedly, taking advantage of 
technology is the quickest and most efficient means possible to facilitate container security. As 
previously mentioned, subsequent to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 all aspects of 
port security were under review. The possibility that a WMD would be smuggled into the United 
9States via cargo containers became more conceivable. The SAFE Port Act signed by President 
George W. Bush, authorized the development of technology inspection equipment that would 
enable United States CBP agents to inspect cargo containers for hazardous materials without 
opening them (Ituh, 2010).
Innovative inspection devices include: CD-2 Human Occupancy Detectors, hand-held 
Radioactive Isotope Identification Devices (RIID), Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM), truck 
mounted Mobile VACIS (gamma ray imaging) Inspection Systems, Relocatable VACIS 
Inspection Systems, and X-ray Imaging Systems (McNicholas, 2008). With such technology at 
the disposal of facilitators, acquiring an increased level of scans is approachable. Nevertheless, 
technology is only as effective as the personnel who operate it.  More specifically, all of the 
abovementioned security devices require personnel to review images, drive portable inspection 
systems, manually scan containers, etc. Therefore, in order to take complete advantage of these 
security innovations, adequate personnel must be competent and efficient.  
 In the past, to sufficiently inspect high risk containers, a trained professional would have 
to physically open the container and spend countless hours conducting a search. For example, it 
takes five CBP inspectors 3 hours to inspect one TEU (Sweet, 2006). More specifically, if CBP 
officers inspected every container, shipments would back up and “we would cripple the 
economy” (Hall, 2006). Therefore, in order to mitigate such inhibitors, ports must exploit 
technological assets. Moreover, utilizing technology in order to share intelligence would 
expedite the security process. In an attempt to satisfy this request, the 9/11 Commission (2007) 
stated a container loaded on a vessel in a foreign port shall not enter the United States unless the 
container was scanned by nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment at 
a foreign port before it was loaded on a vessel. 
10 
 However, in order for such an option to be achieved, a time-efficient inspection process is 
required. Presently, the ability to inspect 100% containers in a punctual manner has been 
scrutinized and perceived as an unfeasible goal. Nevertheless, proper use of nonintrusive 
imaging (NII) techniques allow for a 40-foot container to be completely scanned in 
approximately 6 seconds (McNicholas, 2008). Identifying equilibrium within the security 
process that supports technological assets and effectively facilitates global maritime cooperation 
is the most viable option to acquiring an increased level of container scans/inspections. Bakshi et 
al. (2009) noted the current inspection plan being advanced by the DHS can handle only a small 
percentage of the total load, and significant congestion delay will result.  Instead, Bakshi et al. 
(2009) proposed an alternate inspection protocol that emphasizes screening—a rapid primary 
scan of all containers, followed by a more careful secondary scan of only a few containers that 
fail the primary test—holds promise as a feasible solution. 
 In the last decade the container inspection process has received more attention. Yet, the 
procedure still has major concerns which could hinder the supply chain. In addition, Bakshi et 
al. (2009) identified three areas of concern: firstly, if there is limited scanning and radiation 
detection capacity, the delays resulting from waiting in inspection lines could require containers 
to sit idle at ports for durations that are longer than required in the absence of inspections. 
Secondly, there could be an adequate level of scanning and radiation capacity but if the 
nonintrusive imaging (NII) equipment generates more alarms than there is human inspection 
capacity to resolve, then the result would again be delays as containers wait in inspection lines 
(Bakshi et al., 2009). Finally, Bakshi et al. (2009) noted, the need to divert containers from their 
usual movements within port terminals, redirecting them through a centrally-managed 
government inspection facility, has the potential to engender significant terminal congestion.
  Several security techniques have been implemented in order to prevent tampering. 
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However, these techniques don’t have control over containers once they have been loaded onto 
commercial vessels destined for U.S. ports. Two of the more prominent and successful 
initiatives, the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and the Container Security Initiative (CSI), have 
been employed at multiple international seaports worldwide. Through CSI, CBP officers work 
with host customs administrators to establish security criteria for identifying high-risk 
containers. Those agencies use NII and radiation detection technology to screen high-risk 
containers before they are shipped to U.S. ports (“Operational Csi Ports,” 2006). Furthermore, 
these security measures have been adopted by several foreign seaports. Some of the ports 
include: Montreal, Vancouver and Halifax, Canada; Santos, Brazil; Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands; Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Colombo, Sri Lanka; Port Salalah, Oman; 
and Port Qasim, Pakistan (“Operational Csi Ports,” 2006). The previous statement is further 
proof that the recognition of container security has become a pivotal point in maritime 
transportation.  
 In addition, the SFI has combined with CSI in the security of containers. It is important 
for these initiatives to complement one another when employed. Executive Director Allen Gina 
of CBP explained SFI is a comprehensive model for global supply chain security that enhances 
security while keeping legitimate trade flowing (Blumenthal, 2007).  Furthermore, it leverages 
information, host country government and trade partnerships, plus the latest technology to 
validate the security of goods in maritime shipping containers and reduce the risk of terrorism 
(Blumenthal, 2007). 
Ports of Interest 
Most ports along the Gulf coast have the tendency to become overshadowed by the larger 
international ports located on the eastern and western coasts. However, Gulf Coast seaports are 
12 
nonetheless vulnerable to the aforementioned threats according to the annual imported TEUs and 
tonnage figures (Please see Table 1A and 2A located in the Appendices). Most importantly, the 
expansion of the Panama Canal is to be completed in 2014. Upon this completion, the majority 
of containers transported to the East and West coasts will no longer be necessary. The widening 
of the Panama Canal is going to allow for larger ships to transit and deliver more cargo, 
specifically containers in a capacity that has never been seen at seaports along the Gulf Coast. 
Without proper security protocol emplaced at seaports located along the Gulf Coast, this increase 
in commerce could turn out to be a logistical and defensive nightmare. The ports identified 
include: Port of Galveston, Port of Miami, Port of Houston, Port of New Orleans, Port of 
Gulfport, Port of Mobile, and the Port of Tampa.  
Statement of the Problem 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks changed the outlook of the perceived threat on 
United States soil. As a result, seaports have developed into an important aspect of homeland 
security. The maritime industry has been an integral factor in the global economy. Without the 
use of commercial vessels and containerized cargo, the global economy would come to a sudden 
and unexpected halt. It is conceivable that terrorists would target U.S. seaports in order to cripple 
our economy. Furthermore, the consensus among security experts is that the most probable way 
Americans would be targeted by a nuclear weapon would be for al Qaeda or a future adversary to 
smuggle it into the United States (Flynn, 2008). A Government Accountability Office (2003) 
study found in May 2002, the estimated costs associated with U.S. port closures resulting from a 
detonated WMD could amount to $1 trillion, assuming a prolonged economic slump due to an 
enduring change in our ability to trade. Given the status of our present economy, such an attack 
would be devastating.
13 
Additionally, the constant threat of radical Muslim groups who show interest in acquiring 
WMDs has placed major emphasis on alternative modes of transportation. Many terrorist groups 
have developed an inexplicable fascination with the aviation industry. This perceived fascination 
has almost negated the possibility of terroristic sabotage at seaports in the United States. 
Although there have been no publicized events of terrorist attack within the U.S. seaport 
community, this does not mean that terrorist activity is absent. However, Al Q’aeda has publicly 
taken credit for their involvement in the October 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole (Sweet, 
2006). Although the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole took place in Yemeni waters at the Port of 
Aden, this act of terror was a clear indication of their intentions.
Nevertheless, the absence of surmountable attacks at seaports could lead to the belief that 
terrorist’s value and depend on the maritime industry. Therefore it can be argued that any major 
attack on maritime transportation could eliminate their most successful form of conveyance. 
More specifically, the commercial shipping of containerized cargo poses as an efficient way for 
terrorists to infiltrate and smuggle contraband, equipment, and WMD into the United States with 
virtually no risk of detection. Furthermore, while there have been no known incidents of 
containers being used to transport WMDs, criminals have exploited containers for other illegal 
purposes, such as smuggling weapons, people, and illicit substances (GAO, 2008c). It is critical 
for the seaport community to identify the factors that encourage the tampering of cargo 
containers.
 The security measures implemented at United States seaports are a decisive factor in 
combating potential terrorist attacks. The regulation and security of seaports is a multi-faceted 
operation. No single factor will completely neutralize a terrorist threat. Furthermore, with the 
mass amounts of containers passing through seaports unchecked, there is a seemingly high and 
14 
realistic probability that the components capable to improvise a weapon of mass destruction have 
already slipped through and into the United States without detection.
 Many of the containers transported into the United States via the maritime shipping 
industry, ultimately, pass through seaports without an examination by CBP. CBP officials must 
be able to balance security and commerce. The balance of the inherent tension between security 
and commerce is tantamount to success. For example, strict security measures would impede 
commerce, while less strict security places emphasis on commerce. The latter would, inevitably, 
make our seaports extremely more vulnerable. One study found, “It would cost a U.S. seaport 
approximately $58 billion for a complete shutdown/closure lasting 12 days (“Container Security 
Initiative,” 2006). Instances such as these can be avoided with an effective approach to container 
security. However, since an estimated 95 percent of U.S. imports move by sea, the security 
environment must place a premium on detecting, identifying and tracking terrorist networks with 
interests in disrupting maritime commerce (GAO, 2009). In order to successfully neutralize the 
threat of terrorist attacks it is imperative to formulate a layered approach to containerized cargo 
security transported into United States seaports. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this exploratory qualitative study was to analyze and assess maritime 
security and the perceptions of port deputy director security administrators and USCG officials 
of United States seaports. The researcher conducted personal interviews of those securing 
officials. The research questions guiding this study were: 
1. What are the main threats to seaports along the Gulf Coast? 
2. What is the main threat to containers? 
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3. How do port security administrators and the USCG perceive containerized cargo 
threats? 
Assumptions and Limitations 
 The researcher assumed the participants were truthful in their answers. The sample was 
composed of port deputy directors and USCG. However, in qualitative research, assumptions 
may also constitute limitations. Even with the absolute certainty in an honest answer, it can not 
always guarantee the accuracy. There were regulations that attempted to negate this detriment. In 
addition, this research was limited to telephonic interviews given the geographic restrictions. 
Furthermore, given the current level of scrutiny the maritime community has received in recent 
years, there was a possibility that the sample’s responses may be biased. The findings should not 
be subjected to a limited generalization because the participants were all selected from separate 
ports. The findings should not be deemed representative of the entire population of deputy 
directors, assistant deputy directors, and port security directors. In addition, given the recent 
increase in findings pertaining to empirical research, it should not be difficult to accredit 
previous research. 
 The method of this study utilized the qualitative research technique. More specifically, 
the data collection of this study employed in-depth interviews. Boyce and Neale (2006) indicated 
that “in-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive 
individual interviews with a small number of participants to explore their perspectives on a 
particular idea, program, or situation” (p.3). The population sample of multiple deputy directors 
was used because their separate and particular perceptions of implemented security measures 
would provide a more comprehensive answer group. Additionally, the researcher relied on the 
professional opinions of other researchers who met the criterion for this study. 
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 The researcher attempted to compensate for the potential problems of this study by 
asking the deputy directors to sign an Informed Consent Form that guaranteed confidentiality 
and voluntary participation. Moreover, the researcher tape recorded all interviews and 
transcribed them verbatim.  Finally the researcher asked detailed questions, particular to the 
profession of the participant in order to “explore new issues in depth” and to “provide much 
more detailed information than what is available through other data collection methods, such as 
surveys” (Boyce & Neale, 2006, p. 3). 
Significance of the Study 
 The data collected provided the perceptions of port deputy directors regarding 
implemented security measures at the Port of Galveston, Port of Miami, Port of New Orleans, 
Port of Gulfport, Port of Mobile, and Port of Tampa. The perceptions of the participants were 
utilized to develop more effective container security measures at designated seaports. The 
perceptions of these participants indicated the perceived effectiveness of the implemented 
container security measures. Lastly, this study contributed to the lack of research pertaining to 
the perceived effectiveness as it concerns deputy directors. Depending on the findings generated 
by this study, other significant seaports should be able to apply these findings to current 
implemented container security techniques. 
Definition of Key Terms 
The following terms are defined for the purpose of clarification in understanding the study. 
 Automated Targeting System (ATS). “Program used to assist border inspectors with 
interdicting illegal drugs and other contraband” (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2009b, p. 
12).
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 Container. “A metal box, typically 8 ft wide by 8½ ft high by 20 ft or 40 ft long, that can 
be used on and moved between a tractor-trailer, a rail car, or a ship” (Medalia, 2005, p. 1). 
 Container Security Device. “Communicate evidence of tampering and the will register 
every legitimate, as well as unauthorized, opening of the container” (“Container Security 
Initiative,” 2006, p. 1). 
 Container Security Initiative (CSI). “The screening of containers that pose a risk for 
terrorism is accomplished by teams of CBP officials deployed to work in concert with their host 
nation counterparts” (GAO, 2003, p. 1).  
 Customs and Border Protection (CBP). “Officials who screen data for all containers” 
(Medalia, 2005, p. 2). 
 Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). “A joint government-business 
initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen overall supply chain and border 
security” (“Container Security Initiative,” 2006, p. 1). 
 Deputy Director. “Participates in the development and implementation of the goals and 
objectives of the unit; formulates policies and goals for, and directs the effective and efficient 
operation of a major section/division within the unit” (Deputy Director, p. 1). 
Freight consolidator. “Consolidates shipments into a complete container, and transports 
them across the border” (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2005b, p. 13). 
 Freight Forwarder. “Transports container to the receiving organization” (Scheiber, 2003, 
p. 30). 
 Importer Security Filing (ISF). “Program seeks data on U.S. imported containerized 
cargo (prior to the loading of this cargo on ships at foreign ports) for 10 additional variables and 
information on ship stowage plans and container status messages from shipping lines” 
(Government Accountability Office, 2010).
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 International Port and Ship Facility Security (ISPS) Code. “The code contains detailed, 
security-related requirements for governments port authorities and shipping companies in a 
mandatory section together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in 
secondary, non-mandatory section” (Sweet, 2006).
 Maritime Security Transportation Act. “Integrates the myriad of federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies tasked with securing the international borders of the United States and 
its seaports” (Sweet, 2006). 
 Measure of effectiveness. “The extent and accuracy of the data that supported the 
operation” (Scheiber, 2003, p. 17). 
 Megaport Initiative. “A key component of a multi-agency, multilayered, defensive 
network that strengthens the overall capability of partner countries to deter, detect, and interdict 
illicit trafficking in special nuclear and other radioactive materials at key international seaports” 
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2010). 
 Operation Safe Commerce (OSC). “Was created to provide a test-bed for new security 
techniques that have the potential to increase the security of container shipments” (CBP, 2002). 
 Port operations personnel. “Lead official responsible for the security and safety of the 
vessels and waterways in his or her geographic zone” (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 
2005b, p. 14). 
 Port Security. “Guards containers until another freight forwarder transports it to the 
receiving organization” (Scheiber, 2003, p. 30). 
 Qualitative research. “Methods used to understand some social phenomena from the 
perspectives of those involved, to contextualize issues in their particular socio-cultural-political 
milieu, and sometimes to transform or change social conditions” (Glesne, 2005, p. 4).
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 Seaport. “Means all piers, wharves, docks, and similar structures, adjacent to any waters 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to which a vessel may be secured, including areas 
of land, water, or land and water under and in immediate proximity to such structures, buildings 
on or contiguous to such structures, and the equipment and materials on such structures or in 
such buildings” (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2005d, p. 29). 
 Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). “Pilot program to test the feasibility of scanning 100 
percent of U.S.-bound container cargo” (Government Accountability Office, 2009, p. 7). 
 Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act. “Authorized the development of 
high technology inspection equipment that would enable United States CBP agents to inspect 
cargo containers for dangerous materials without opening them” (Ituh, 2010).  
 Strategic Trade Corridor Strategy. “One of the two initiatives added to the layered maritime 
security approach in order to specifically augment SFI” (Government Accountability Office, 2009).
 Transportation Worker Information Credential (TWIC). “Program aims to protect the 
nation’s maritime transportation facilities and vessels by requiring maritime workers to complete 
background checks and obtain a biometric identification card in order to gain unescorted access 
to the secure areas of regulated facilities and vessels” (GAO, 2009, p. 7).
Twenty Equivalent Unit (TEU). “The 20-foot container or TEU became the industry 
standard reference, now cargo volume and vessel capacity are commonly measured in TEU” 
(World Shipping Council, 2011). 
Twenty Four Hour Rule. “Rule that requires manifest and bill of lading information to be 
submitted to CBP 24 hours in advance of the cargo being loaded on a ship at a foreign port” 
(Customs and Border Protection, 2006).
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Summary 
This thesis presents the findings of the researcher as well as relevant and available 
literature. This study examines the perceptions of deputy directors of operations or security at 
selected seaports regarding the effectiveness of implemented container security measures. The 
perceptions of the selected officials were explored to establish similarities and differences in 
their perceptions. 
 Chapter 2 provides a review of pertinent literature. The literature review indicated the 
importance of continuing research regarding the perceived effectiveness of implemented 
container security measures at designated seaports. Understanding the reasoning behind a 
successful technique is essential to improving container security. 
 Chapter 3 contains the methodological design implemented and descriptions of the 
subjects, instruments, and procedures. The researcher’s rationale for selecting a qualitative 
method was to gather pertinent information by personally interviewing port officials in regards to 
container security. Further, the study’s purpose and research questions are clearly provided for 
the reader. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the data gathered from the research and Chapter 5 
was devoted to providing conclusions, policy recommendations and suggestions for container 
security based on the research and findings. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction 
 According to the Government Accountability Office (2008) study, “while Customs and 
Border Protection has noted that the likelihood of terrorists smuggling WMDs into the United 
States in cargo containers is low, the nation’s vulnerability to this activity and the consequences 
of such an attack are potentially high” (p. 9). Comparatively, “terrorists could use shipping 
containers or vessels to smuggle personnel and weapons…and if attacks were successful it would 
not only harm the United States but also disrupt the global economy” (Thibault, Brooks, & 
Button, 2006, p. 3). There is an interest in protecting seaports in the United States from terrorist 
attack.
 More specifically, terrorist capabilities to exploit containerized cargo to transport 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are frequently disregarded as a possibility. According to 
GAO (2008) study, theft and smuggling of weapons-usable nuclear material is not a hypothetical 
concern, but an ongoing reality: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 
documented 18 cases of seizures of stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) over the 
past decade. In addition Ituh (2010) stated, “Container security is not primarily about port 
security; it is about everyplace security indispensable and ubiquitous, a container is an excellent 
vector, or carrier, for weapons of mass destructions (WMDs) such as nukes or dirty bombs” 
(p.48).
The vulnerability of the maritime container transport system could be easily exploited by 
those who wish to do so. To better illustrate this point CSI (2006) found that on October 18, 
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2001, port authorities in the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro discovered a stowaway within a 
well-appointed shipping container complete with bed, heater, toilet facilities and water.  
Furthermore, the man’s belongings included a cell phone, a satellite phone, a laptop computer 
and ominously, given previous events, airport security passes and an airline mechanic’s 
certificate valid for several international airports (CSI, 2006) 
 The security of seaports is a multi-faceted operation. Additionally, there are several 
factors that make containerized cargo vulnerable to manipulation. Ergo, there are several security 
measures that need to be utilized to neutralize each individual threat. The U.S. Congressional 
Research Service (2005d) stated, “Right now, none of these initiatives has changed the 
intermodal transportation environment sufficiently to fundamentally reduce the vulnerability of 
the cargo container as a means of terrorism” (p. 6). The previous statement alludes to the need 
for a security environment that requires the use of multiple techniques/procedures.  Cohen (2005) 
noted, “There is no way to completely inspect all the millions of containers entering the United 
States. Given the difficulties of complete inspections, defense needs to be layered, with checks at 
multiple stages on a container’s journey” (p.48). 
In regards to the previous statement the Director of DHS, Stephen L. Caldwell, agreed by 
stating, “CBP has developed a layered security strategy that provides multiple opportunities to 
mitigate threats and allows CBP to focus its limited resources on cargo containers that are the 
most likely to pose a risk to the U.S.” (GAO, 2008a, p. 7). However, there have been significant 
and extensive reviews of previous initiatives in order to optimize efficiency. For example, 
Bakshi, Flynn, and Gans (2009) concluded that a modified-Secure Freight Initiative (SFI)/ 
“Industry-centric regime” should be able to provide better inspection coverage than CSI at a 
lower unit cost.
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 Nonetheless, an international seaport’s extreme vulnerability to exploitation leaves major 
concerns.  The sheer magnitude of containers being imported and exported severely complicates 
the security process. Without the complete cooperation of existing agencies and security 
affiliates, efficient container security is difficult to maintain. Both governments and shipping 
lines have long been concerned with the security of the global container supply chain (Thibault 
et al., 2006). However, due to the lack of manpower and resources, port officials have turned to 
technology to assist in the inspection of containers. 
Security administrators and facilitators alike utilize technologies that have been proven 
successful on a limited scale. Moreover, most seaports observe the success or failure of 
competitors and/or partners before making a decision that could affect the input and output of the 
seaport itself. Many prior studies on the adoption of technology have embraced this perspective 
(e.g. Loh and Venkatraman, 1992). Comparatively, rational adopters make decisions and choices 
based on the information that is received via communication and social networks (Rogers, 
1995).More specifically, the success or failure of a security technique depends on the perceived 
effectiveness. In other words, for a security technique to be considered a success, it must first be 
perceived as a success by those facilitating the technique and, more importantly, by those 
considering adopting the technique. Lun, Wong, Lai, and Cheng (2008) found that organizations 
in the container transport chain tend to adopt similar container transport chain management 
practices as they integrate processes, develop standards, and adopt technology in order to achieve 
effective communication, quality improvements, and cost reductions to enhance container 
transport security.  
In order to achieve container security on such a large scale, cooperation is a critical factor 
for all seaports to consider. Lee and Whang (2005) stated, “The risk of a security breach at any 
one link in the global supply chain could compromise the security of the entire container 
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transport chain” (p. 21). Banomyong (2005) added, “global economic integration relies upon 
efficient global supply chains but integration can only succeed if security is a guarantee as there 
is a relative degree of mistrust among trading nations”(p. 6).  
 The maritime transport system is faced with numerous threats which have become more 
sophisticated and dynamic in recent years. Therefore, it should be noted that security threats 
aren’t limited to “terrorism”, but also include stowaways, piracy, drug/ contraband smuggling, 
cargo tampering, use of the vessel to carry perpetrators and their equipment, and the use of the 
vessel as a weapon (McNicholas, 2008). Most importantly, all members of the transport system 
would benefit from a more cooperative and collaborative relationship.
Twenty Equivalent Units (TEUs) 
 Containerization is one of the single most factors responsible for the high-level of 
efficiency attributed to modern day commerce. Containers became standardized carriage of 
freight, starting from the 1950’s and really taking hold in the 1960’s (“Standard Shipping 
Container,” 2009). Furthermore, standardization now applies across the global industry, thanks 
to the work of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) that in 1961, set standard 
sizes for all containers (“World Shipping Council,” 2011). Bohlman (2001) illustrated the 
previous point by stating, “World trade continues to grow and freight containers are, and are 
expected to remain, the most economical balance between cargo security, transportation costs 
and speed of delivery for the majority of packaged cargo” (p.13). More specifically, cargo 
containers accomplished this by initiating standards. Shipping containers by their very nature are 
‘Standard’ (“Standard Shipping Container,” 2009).  
 ISO regulations are very specific and for several reasons. Simply put, containers are 
designed to carry cargo. However, their design also allows for maximum storage, both for the 
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cargo inside and for the subsequent placement onboard commercial supply vessels. The design is 
regulated by the ISO. Container sizes are usually defined by the length e.g. 20ft or 40ft. The 
second variant is the height, most commonly eight feet six inches but with nine feet six inches 
becoming more common. The width is generally 8ft but can also be 2.5m (“Standard Shipping 
Container,” 2009). The length in a twenty equivalent unit (TEU) could vary to 24 or 35 feet and 
still be expressed as 1 TEU. Further, only the width at 8 feet remains consistent between the 
various sizes (Shipping Housing Container Guide, 2010). TEUs are the most common and 
widely used container. The World Shipping Council (WSC) (2011) explained the 20-foot 
container or TEU became the industry standard reference, now cargo volume and vessel capacity 
is commonly measured in TEU (Please see Table 3A located in Appendix A). However, recent 
research has indicated that in the 21st century the 48 and 53 foot containers are more popular for 
international ocean-going ships (Shipping Housing Container Guide, 2010). 
 The most significant factor for TEU usage is its ability to circumvent limitations 
associated with the conveyance procedure. Ocean-going and short sea container vessels have 
been optimized for their carriage at the standard dimensions in order to facilitate safe and 
efficient transport. Furthermore, the WSC (2011) noted container sizes must be standardized so 
that the containers can be efficiently stacked - literally, one on top of the other - and so ships, 
trains, trucks and cranes at the ports can be specially fitted or built to a single size 
specification. The standardization of cargo containers made it possible for commercial vessels to 
transport thousands of TEUs at a time (“World Shipping Council,” 2011). This process is single 
handedly responsible for the speed of commerce today. Bohlman (2001) illustrated this point by 
stating “Containerization has reduced the time and cost of moving goods across the oceans to 
market by 84 % and 35 % respectively” (p. 13). 
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 However, with all the added benefits that come from containerization, vulnerabilities 
have surfaced. For example, the physical characteristics of a standard TEU do not typically come 
fitted with sophisticated security deterrents. In most cases, these containers are fashioned with a 
dual bolts and locking arms that operate as a locking mechanism. Furthermore, it is standard 
procedure to apply additional locks that can reinforce the existing mechanism. However, most 
containers are sealed with mechanical bolts that can be cut and replaced or have doors that can 
be removed by dismantling hinges (Bridis, 2006). These locking mechanisms can be easily 
defeated with access to simple hardware (e.g. power drill, hack saw, screw driver, etc.). The right 
door hardware has long been considered the Achilles’ heel of oceangoing container security.
Several years ago when this method first appeared, the perpetrators would use a steel chisel and 
hammer to remove the rivet from the door handle (“Cargo Container Vulnerabilities,” 2005). 
 In addition, Bridis (2006) noted that containers could be opened aboard some ships 
during week long voyages to America. More specifically, due to the time involved in transit 
(and) the fact that most vessel crew members are foreigners with limited credentialing and 
vetting, containers are vulnerable to intrusion during the ocean voyage (Bridis, 2006). 
Exacerbating this concern is the fact that that the sheer volume and the nature of the shipping 
continuum make marine shipping containers a target for exploitation by terrorists (Customs and 
Border Protection, 2007). 
Threats to Seaport Security 
Piracy 
 Piracy and the repercussions it produces is a major threat to the maritime environment 
and, particularly, containerized shipping. Identifying this threat is an important step in revising 
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the current container security framework. Furthermore, understanding the legislation defining 
piracy will permit administrators to improve and expand current security limitations. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982) stated: 
According to article 101 piracy is defined as: “a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, 
or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a 
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or 
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, 
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State. 
b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
c) Any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub- 
paragraph (a) or (b).” (p. 1)  
Similarly, the U.S. Code (2002) defined piracy as, “pursuant to 18 USCS § 1651, whoever, on 
the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards 
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.” 
 The threat of piracy has received more attention in recent years. However, this problem 
has frequented the maritime community for centuries. Evans (2004) explained that throughout 
maritime history, maintaining security onboard vessels at sea and in port along waterfronts has 
been an ongoing challenge. Additionally, from Blackbeard’s days as the world’s most infamous 
pirate… to the Straits of Malacca pirates, the maritime environment has always been rife with 
opportunity for criminals to perform acts of violence and other crimes on the sea (Evans, 2004). 
 In regards to Somali piracy, Spittle (2011) found, “The predatory pattern evolved from 
defensive piracy that began early in the last decade as a response by local fishermen to 
unlicensed foreign trawlers and the dumping of toxic waste” (p.2). Furthermore, many of the 
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pirates claim to have begun as fishermen and said they were stopping illegal foreign fishing 
boats from stealing Somali fish (Doyle, 2009). Whatever the reason, piracy has become a 
ubiquitous threat to containerized cargo and commercial vessels. 
 According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), over 3,300 cases of piracy have 
occurred since 1993 (Walters, 2007).  The aforementioned statement reveals how serious an 
issue piracy has become. Furthermore, the Gulf of Aden has become an area of increasing 
concern. However, piracy is a global dilemma. Carafano, Weitz and Andersen’s (2009) research 
concluded that over 10 percent of the global waterborne transportation of oil passes through the 
Gulf [of Aden]. About 7 percent of the world’s maritime commerce transits the Suez Canal.  
Additionally, about 80 percent of the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden carry cargo to and from 
Europe, East Africa, South Asia, and the Far East, although a significant portion of the cargo 
carried is eventually bound for the United States (Carafano et al., 2009). The waters off the coast 
of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden are not the only areas conflicted with piracy.  
 This problem has grown to encompass and threaten many maritime trade corridors 
around the globe.  Walters (2007) stated nine locations represented over two-thirds of the piracy 
world-wide. Of those, the Gulf of Aden represented only 2%. Whereas, the Malacca Straits 
represented 11.6% and Indonesia accounted for 28%. Combined, the Malacca Straits and 
Indonesia generated over 40% of the piracy attacks world-wide (Walters, 2007). Moreover, 
McNicholas (2008) found that between the years 2002-2007, a total of 63% of the attempted and 
actual pirate attacks occurred along the coast of Southeast Asia and Africa. Additionally, the 
coast of Indonesia had the highest number of attacks in 2006 and Nigeria has the third highest 
number of attacks and the most kidnap victims (McNicholas, 2008).  
 As a result of this threat, the security of cargo, equipment and personnel has remained a 
topic of concern. Since the advent of piracy, crew members have been presented with the 
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obligation of administering security. From a shipboard or seaside viewpoint, the earliest attempts 
at self-defense against maritime piracy involved arming the crew and defending the ship to the 
last man (Flynn, 2008). Furthermore, regardless of the port state’s ability to maintain coastal and 
port security, ship owners and vessel operators considered the defense of the ship and the safety 
of the cargo to be the responsibility of the shipmaster and crew (Flynn, 2008). The International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (2011) explained that before 1992, shipmasters and ship operators 
had nowhere to turn to when their ships were attacked, robbed or hijacked either in port or out at 
sea. More surprisingly, local law enforcement either turned a deaf ear, or chose to ignore that 
there was a serious problem in their waters. This lapse in vessel security, eventually, generated 
enough attention to get international authorities involved. 
 The International Chamber of Commerce (2011) stated the ICC International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) is a specialized division of the ICC. IMB’s main task is to protect the integrity of 
international trade by seeking out fraud and malpractice. More specifically, concerned at the 
alarming growth in the phenomenon, this led to the creation of the IMB Piracy Reporting 
Centre in 1992 (ICC, 2011). The Centre is based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It maintains a 
round-the-clock watch on the world’s shipping lanes, reporting pirate attacks to local law 
enforcement and issuing warnings about piracy hotspots to shipping (ICC, 2011). 
Moreover, the IMB has separated piracy attacks into three categories: 1) low-level armed 
robbery, 2) medium-level armed robbery, and 3) major criminal hijacks (Chalk, 2008). 
According to Chalk (2008) low level armed robbery attacks are anchorage attacks mounted 
against ships at harbor. Furthermore, the “low level” attack was characterized as opportunist 
attacks mounted close to land by small, high-speed craft crewed by maritime “muggers” 
normally armed with knives (Chalk, 2008). Their purpose is typically to seize cash and portable 
high-value personal items with an average haul of $5,000–$15,000. Whereas, medium-level 
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armed robberies are represented by violent thefts involving serious injury or murder by well-
organized gangs who usually operate from a “mother ship” and are equipped with modern 
weaponry (Chalk, 2008). Finally, major criminal hijacks are well-resourced and meticulously 
planned, employing highly trained and heavily armed syndicates working in conjunction with 
land-based operatives and brokers (Chalk, 2008). Most piracy incidents that reach the media’s 
attention illustrate the more detrimental or major criminal degree of hijacking. However, it 
should be understood that the majority of piracy attacks remain unpublicized. 
 Still, Chalk (2008) explained when a major criminal hijack occurs a vessel will first be 
seized and its cargo offloaded at sea. The ships are then renamed and reregistered under flags of 
convenience and issued with false documentation to enable them to take on fresh payloads. In 
addition, Chalk (2008) noted the new cargo, which is never delivered to its intended destination, 
is taken to a designated port where it is sold to a buyer who is often a willing participant in the 
venture. The latter represents the most significant and challenging threat to deter. According to 
IMB data, Somali pirates hold 33 vessels and 758 hostages (Spittle, 2011). In addition, in 
January alone the bureau recorded 35 attacks, claiming seven ships along with148 new hostages 
(Spittle, 2011).
 Surprisingly, even with aforementioned accumulated losses, some ship owners are 
apprehensive to ask for assistance. Officials with the IMB in Kuala Lumpur assert that most ship 
owners are reluctant to alert authorities about attacks on their vessels, largely because subsequent 
investigations and delays result in costs that the ship companies themselves must bear (Chalk, 
2008).  With annual piracy estimates ranging between $5 billion and $7 billion, some ship 
companies would rather take the risk of an attack than add to the surmountable deficit (Spittle, 
2011). Furthermore, exacerbating this reluctance is the fear that reporting incidents will merely 
raise maritime insurance premiums by forcing owner-operators to acknowledge that they were 
31 
not practicing basic security measures (Chalk, 2008). In some instances, these anti-piracy 
security costs equate to a higher cost than an actual attack. Additionally, Chalk (2008) found that 
the combined magnitude of losses associated with reporting incidents would, in most cases, 
greatly outweigh those resulting from a piracy attack; in instances of low-level theft, ransacking, 
and hostage taking. More specifically, costs tend to represent only two to ten percent of the value 
of the targeted boat and its cargo (Chalk, 2008).  
 The Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) division of the IMB uses a two-pronged approach in 
order to mitigate these challenges. This objective targets those individuals who are most likely to 
be affected if attacked (i.e. ship-owners, ship master, insurance companies, etc.).  
The International Chamber of Commerce (2011) stated: 
The main function of the PRC is two fold: 1) To be the single point of contact for ship 
Masters anywhere in the world who are under piratical or armed robbery attack. The 
information received from the Masters is immediately relayed to the local law 
enforcement agencies requesting assistance. 2) The information received from the ship 
Masters is immediately broadcast to all vessels in the Ocean region - thus high-lighting 
the threat to a Master enroute into the area of risk. (p. 2) 
Even with the staggering number of piracy cases in the past twenty years, there have been two 
significant maritime events, in particular, that demonstrated the vulnerability of ships at sea and 
caught the attention of the world through close media coverage: the hijackings of the Santa
Maria and the Achille Lauro (Flynn, 2008).  In regards to the Santa Maria, Chalk (2008) 
explained in 1961, the Santa Maria, a 21,000-ton cruise ship was hijacked by a group of 70 men 
led by Captain Henriques Galvao (a Portuguese political exile) to bring global attention to the 
Estado Novo in Portugal and fascist regime in Spain (p.48). 
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 Also, in 1985, The Achille Lauro, another cruise ship, was hijacked by the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in an attempt to obtain the release of 50 fellow incarcerated 
terrorists being held in Israel. The attempt was unsuccessful and one American citizen was, 
inevitably, killed (Walters, 2007). However, it should be mentioned that prior to the IMB 
definition of piracy in 2005, the hijackings of the Santa Maria (political protest) and the Achille 
Lauro (terrorism) were not considered piracy (Chalk, 2008). In support, Walters’s (2007) found, 
“According to the political offenses exemption exception, piracy must be initiated for “private 
ends” such as personal profit to be considered piracy.”
 Therefore, the IMB (2005) created its own working definition: “An act of boarding or 
attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with 
the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” (p.1). This definition 
successfully jettisons any exception or requirement that would allow piracy to evade jurisdiction 
(Walters, 2007). Nevertheless, these hijackings accurately revealed the vulnerability facing 
commercial shipping liners in the current maritime environment. Moreover, with maritime 
commercial vessels transiting trade corridors with nearly 90% of the world’s cargo, there are 
countless targets for criminals and terrorists to target. 
Types of Vessels Being Targeted by Terrorists 
 More recently, terrorists have shifted their focus to commercial vessels and the cargo 
being transported. Piracy affiliates are cognizant of the value that can be associated with such 
vessels. McNicholas (2008) noted that, “A freighter is a general term encompassing a wide 
variety of oceangoing ships. However, currently, few conventional freighters remain in service. 
Instead, specialized ships are built for particular trades (McNicholas, 2008). Most ships can be 
classified into three categories: bulk dry carriers, container ships and oil tankers. Furthermore, 
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these three categories do not only differ in the ships' physical characteristics, but also in their 
mobility patterns and networks (Kaluza, Kolzsch, Gastner & Blasius, 2010). Therefore, with 
general knowledge criminals, terrorists, and pirates can pick and choose their targets depending 
on their intentions.
 For example, bulk carriers are designed to carry one type of cargo at a time. Products 
include fertilizers, iron ore, coal, and grain (McNicholas, 2008). Additionally, tankers carry just 
one type of cargo—crude oil (McNicholas, 2008). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers transport 
natural gas, and while this would seem a natural target for terrorists, the ship’s outer hull, ballast 
tanks, void space and pressurized tanks are built from stainless steel, making it very difficult to 
penetrate (McNicholas 2008). Finally, chemical tankers carry many different grades of 
petroleum and liquid chemical cargo (McNicholas, 2008). Moreover, the Coast Guard considers 
cruise ships to be highly attractive targets to terrorists and cruise ships can represent high-
prestige symbolic targets for terrorists (GAO, 2010c).
  Pirates have started targeting container ships and tankers in recent years (Carafano et al., 
2009). Their reasons for targeting such vessels remain undetermined. However, it can be 
deduced that container ships and tankers represent the more vulnerable of the types of vessels.  
Moreover, GAO (2007b) noted, our nation’s economy and security are heavily dependent on oil, 
natural gas, and other energy commodities of which nearly half of the nation’s oil is transported 
from overseas by tankers. This type of ship could be a target for terrorist activities due to its slow 
speed and low freeboard—the distance from the water line to the main deck—which may permit 
easier boarding from a smaller vessel (McNicholas, 2008). In addition, container ships follow 
regularly repeating paths whereas bulk dry carriers and oil tankers move less predictably 
between ports (Kaluza et al., 2010). Furthermore, John Pike of Global Security stated 
the cargo ship Maersk Alabama was attacked by pirates early on the morning of April 8, 2009 
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and presumed hijacked. More specifically, the vessel was en route to Mombasa, Kenya, when it 
was assaulted about 300 miles off Somalia's coast (“Maersk A-Class,” 2011). The previous 
statement demonstrates the growing audacity hijackers.
 According to the IMB, 30 percent (490 of 1,650) of vessels reporting pirate attacks 
worldwide from 2006 through 2010 were identified as tankers (GAO, 2011). The vast areas at 
risk for piracy off the Horn of Africa, combined with the small number of military ships 
available for patrolling them, make protecting energy tankers difficult (GAO, 2007b). 
Additionally, GAO’s (2011) research found that, “Pirate attacks on energy tankers have tripled in 
the last five years. From January to June in 2011, 100 tankers were attacked, a 37 percent 
increase from 2010.” Given the U.S.’s dependence on oil and other energy sustaining 
substances, the increase in attacks on tankers could be interpreted as a direct attempt to harm the 
U.S. economy.  In comparison, Spittle (2011) stated, “In early 2010 Maran Centaurus, a Greek-
owned tanker was reported to have fetched between $5.5 million and $7 million after being held 
for 50 days” (p.3). Additionally, in November (2010) last year a South Korean oil tanker, the 
Samho Dream, captured in April, set a new record when it was released after a payment of $9.5 
million (Spittle, 2011).  
 However, McNicholas (2008) explained, “Attacks on bulk carriers (ships specifically 
designed to transport unpackaged bulk such as grain, oil, etc.) from 1995 to 2006 show that these 
types of ships are the clear favorite targets, accounting for 60% of all ships attacked” (p.38). 
Nevertheless, from a security standpoint, this carrier would be considered as one of the last types 
of vessels that a terrorist would use to carry out a hostile mission (McNicholas, 2008, p.38).  
 In contrast, over 9 million passengers departed from U.S. ports on cruise ships in 2008, 
and according to agency officials, cruise ships are attractive terrorist targets (GAO, 2010c). 
Terrorists could emplace and detonate an improvised explosive device (IED) inside a cruise ship 
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compartment killing hundreds or thousands of innocent victims. For this reason, a cruise ship 
could be viewed as a high value target for terrorists. As mentioned previously, the hijacking of 
the cruise ship Achille Lauro and killing of passenger Leon Klinghoffer by terrorists in 1985 was 
a watershed event for the cruise industry, leading to major changes in cruise line security 
procedures (GAO, 2007b). 
 Nevertheless, in 2006, worldwide reported attacks against ships decreased from 276 to 
239 (McNicholas, 2008). This decline in incidents is probably attributed to proactive measures 
taken by ship crews at designated hotspot areas and the heightened presence of naval forces in 
these areas (McNicholas, 2008). However, Erik Rabjerg Nielsen, the director and head of 
operations and deployment for Maersk Line stated, “In 2010 one hijacking attempt was 
registered every six days, and in 2011 there’s been a large increase in the activity. The problem 
has never been larger than right now” (Pelton, 2011). 
 However, Carafano et al. (2009) found, “In 2007, 53 container cargo ships were attacked 
transiting the Gulf of Aden, compared to 52 chemical tankers. Additionally, McNicholas (2008) 
stated, “From a security perspective, container ships pose perhaps the greatest threat because the 
majority of them maintain an advertised, published, tight schedule” (p.39). Furthermore, this 
presents a large opportunity for criminal or terrorist entities to ship explosives, persons, or 
equipment, via containers (McNicholas, 2008). 
 There are numerous counter piracy measures being utilized throughout the world. Spittle 
(2011) states Operation Atalanta, the European Union (EU) contingent for counter piracy, which 
was originally created mainly to protect the United Nation’s World Food Program shipments to 
Somalia, but has expanded to take on a general anti-piracy role. Another contingent, Operation 
Ocean Shield, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standing maritime group with a 
similar remit to the EU force and with overlapping national contributions has a presence in high 
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risk shipping corridors. In addition, the U.S. contributed additional naval forces as part of the 
multinational anti-piracy effort, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) (Carafano et al., 2011). 
Still, other nations participating in anti-piracy operations include Great Britain, Germany, 
France, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, China and Saudi 
Arabia. In 2009, about 20 naval ships patrolled the waters in and around the Gulf of Aden 
(Carafano et al., 2011). This effort represents global collaboration toward a shared threat. If this 
same view was accepted by the global community in regards to container security much could be 
accomplished (See Table 4A located in the Appendices). 
Organized Crime/Terrorism 
 The nexus between piracy and organized crime has become clear over the past 10 years, 
and the thin line between certain incidents of piracy and terrorism has become increasingly 
blurred (McNicholas, 2008). Somali terrorist organizations operating off the Horn of Africa such 
as Al-Shabab have taken notice to the advantages of manipulating the maritime supply chain. 
Carafano et al. (2009) stated Al-Shabab benefits from the pirate activities in several ways. Pirates 
are used to smuggle goods and weapons from Yemen to Somalia. In addition, there are 
documented cases where pirates have transported foreign fighters into the country, and terrorists 
out, including one of the perpetrators on a bombing in Yemen in March 2009 that killed four 
South Korean tourists (Carafano et al., 2009).  GAO (2008a) supported Carafano et al.’s previous 
statements by explaining while there have been no known incidents of containers being used to 
transport WMDs, criminals have exploited containers for other illegal purposes, such as 
smuggling weapons, people, and illicit substances. Therefore, it is not unlikely that terrorist 
organizations would exploit the container conveyance system in a similar manner.   
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 More specifically, some reports suggest that pirates have been helping train and equip the 
militias so that they can expand Islamist control over the Somali coastal waters (Carafano et al., 
2009). Furthermore, McNicholas (2008) stated “The Free Aceh Movement, a separatist group 
which—according to research conducted at the Singapore-based Institute of Defense and 
Strategic Studies—utilizes piracy to fund its fight against the Indonesian government” (p. 171). 
On the other hand, Walters (2007) stated that, “organized crime syndicates are also busily 
engaged in the business of piracy. More importantly, Gottschalk and Flanagan (2000) found that 
Southeast Asia and South America seem particularly prone to this type of piracy. Organized 
crime affiliates and terrorists have come to realize that this industry can be exploited more 
efficiently with a cooperative agreement. 
 In comparison, Carafano et al. (2009) found, “Ransom and increased security costs in the 
Gulf of Aden total less than a billion dollars a year. Pirate attacks affect a small fraction of the 
ships transiting the gulf.”  Whereas, the U.S. confronts transnational criminal cartels that 
smuggle guns, drugs, people, and money as part of a $25-billion-a-year enterprise that threatens 
U.S. sovereignty and directly affects many citizens in the U.S. and Mexico (Carafano et al., 
2009). Furthermore, Mayhew (2001) stated, “Worldwide, cargo losses have been estimated at 
$30 billion a year, and the incidence is probably increasing. Organized crime is responsible for 
nearly half of these losses.”  Publicover (1999) added, “Transnational criminal operations use the 
entire international shipping cycle, in particular, the maritime and trucking transportation 
shipping system and the freight forwarding sector, to support stolen merchandise trafficking.”
Containerization played a critical role in improving the shipping process and, inevitably, the 
entire flow of commerce world-wide. However, this revolution has negative side effects that 
continue to aggravate the maritime community.  
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Container Theft 
 Containerization has played a pivotal role in modern day commerce efficiency. However, 
Publicover’s (1999) research found, “The “container revolution” which has increased 
transportation efficiency and spawned the rapidly growing intermodal freight transportation 
industry, may have inadvertently encouraged organized criminal presence in freight 
transportation” (p.8). The previous statement must be considered as a viable explanation for the 
perpetual existence of container theft. Publicover (1999) adds, before cargo was containerized 
“break-bulk” (goods that must be loaded individually) was extremely vulnerable to theft at all 
points within the global supply chain, especially off-loading. Mayhew (2001) supported 
Publicover’s claim by stating, “Cargo is particularly vulnerable while in the process of being 
loaded or unloaded from trucks, or through documentary fraud.   
 Still, containers not only revolutionized shipping but also served as a security mechanism 
for cargo. When first introduced, containers successfully reduced pilferage. Estimates indicated 
that during the early years of the container revolution, theft of containerized cargo dropped to 
less than a tenth of a percent (Publicover, 1999). Nevertheless, after the initial honeymoon period 
during which criminals adjusted to the new container system, other patterns of theft developed 
(Publicover, 1999). For example, Mayhew (2001) found that organized crime gangs involved in 
drug smuggling or illicit arms shipments may hide items on vessels or in listed cargo that is later 
stolen.  More specifically, containers stored in terminals could now be stolen as a whole, opened 
and made subject to pilferage, or serve as a conduit for drug smuggling (Publicover, 1999). 
 Furthermore, large-scale theft at freight forwarding yards frequently follows collusion 
between a truck driver and a warehouse employee, with between 80 and 99 percent of cargo 
thefts, in the United States and Australia, involving employees in one way or another (Atkinson 
2001; Ackerman 1997). Similar behavior could be present in freight forwarders and other 
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personnel associated with the loading and off-loading of containers. Comparatively, Publicover 
(1999) found that, “Criminals act with apparent information about cargo manifests, suggesting 
that collusion is occurring with transportation employees. However, Atkinson (2001) stated, 
“While lone employees have been historically responsible for most cargo theft, crime syndicates 
pose an increasing threat. Surprisingly, Mayhew (2001) found, “Under-reporting is widespread 
as freight-forwarders may prefer to protect their supply of customers and fear bad publicity.”
 In order to mitigate these challenges Mayhew (2001) explained, “Security and customs 
authorities should be aware of all vessel movements, have up-to-date detailed cargo information 
(destination, consignees, special handling) and be alert to unusual documents because 
discrepancies may indicate illegal activity”(p. 5). However, it is increasingly more difficult to 
deter. Estimates indicate that well over 80 percent of all theft and pilferage of transportation 
cargo is accomplished by, with the collusion of, persons whose employment entitles them access 
to the cargo that is stolen (Publicover, 1999). 
Stowaways 
 According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) a stowaway is defined as a 
person who hides aboard a ship, airplane, etc. to get free passage, evade port officials, etc 
(“International Convention for,” 2011). Stowaways are generally regarded as a low-level threat. 
McNicholas (2008) explains, “The overwhelming majority of stowaways are looking for 
economic opportunity and a better life for themselves and probably their families” (p.173). 
Nevertheless, the threat stowaways pose to security should not be overlooked. In 2002, reports 
surfaced that a group of twenty-five Islamic extremists had entered the U.S. by stowing away in 
shipping containers (Booth & Altenbrun, 2002). More specifically, these extremists were 
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believed to enter through ports in Ports in Florida, Georgia, and California (Booth & Altenbrun, 
2002). That being said, this threat should be regarded as probable and dangerous. 
 However, the ensuing legislation makes dealing with such problems complicated. The 
standards and recommended practices for stowaways reflect the Guidelines on the Allocation of 
Responsibilities to Seek the Successful Resolution of Stowaway Cases (Resolution A.871 (20)), 
adopted in 1997, which established basic principles to be applied in dealing with stowaways 
(“International Convention for,” 2011). However, Booth and Altenbrun (2002) stated, “United 
States law relating to stowaways is contained primarily in the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act (INA)” (p.44). And within this law it states that stowaways do not have a right to 
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) hearing and are subject to immediate removal 
from the U.S. (Booth & Altenburn, 2002). 
 In addition, the guidelines in the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful 
Resolution of Stowaway Cases states that the resolution of stowaway cases is difficult because of 
different national legislation in the various countries involved (“International Convention for,” 
2011). Booth and Altenbrun (2002) agreed with the IMO’s claim stating, “Since the U.S. is a 
signatory of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and they are subject to the 
enforcement of the 1951 Convention, which prohibits a state from expelling or returning a 
refugee to a territory” (p. 44). More specifically, the 1951 Convention explains expulsion of a 
refugee is prohibited to a place “where his/her life of freedom would be threatened on his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (p.44).
 To mitigate complications such as the aforementioned, the IMO guidelines advocate 
close co-operation between ship-owners and port authorities (“International Convention for,” 
2011). One such example is the INA’s establishment a financial burden on any ship owner which 
transports a stowaway, including a $3,000 fine for any stowaway who escapes ashore (Booth & 
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Altenburn, 2002). In comparison, the IMO guidelines say that every effort should be made to 
avoid situations where a stowaway has to be detained on board a ship indefinitely (“International 
Convention for,” 2011).
 However, the guidelines and legislation do not just affect the ship-owner. These 
stipulations recommend that a much more elaborate investigation be conducted.
The “International Convention for” (2011) stated
The guidelines then go on to establish in greater detail the responsibilities of the master, 
of the ship-owner or operator, of the country of the first scheduled port of call after the 
discovery of the stowaway (the port of disembarkation), of the country where the 
stowaway first boarded the ship, of the stowaway's apparent or claimed country of 
nationality, of the flag State of the vessel, and of any countries of transit during 
repatriation. (p. 2) 
The intricacies of this process discourage ship owner and operator cooperation. Nevertheless, 
strict guidelines are inherent in order to maintain a thorough process that is accommodating to 
the stowaway and, in addition, to the ship owner and operator. Finally, in 1998, the Facilitation 
Committee issued a Circular inviting IMO Member Governments and international organizations 
in consultative status to provide the Organization with information on stowaway incidents 
(“International Convention for,” 2011).More importantly, this process diverts administrators and 
other personnel from more significant issues. 
  The majority of stowaway incidents is actually organized human smuggling operations 
and managed by local or transnational human trafficking organizations (McNicholas, 2008). The 
aforementioned statement represents a small portion of organized crimes’ broadening scope. 
These organizations have an infrastructure within the port and contacts developed within the port 
entities, such as port police, stevedores, local security guards deployed onboard the ship, 
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container and seal checkers, etc (McNicholas, 2008). In addition McNicholas’s (2008) research 
found in poor countries—such as Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, and Dominican 
Republic—a port security guard makes his “real” pay collecting bribes and generally must pay 
his supervisor for the opportunity to be positioned closer to the dock. McNicholas (2008) further 
explained, “Being positioned closer to the dock puts personnel in a more opportune position to 
collect larger and more frequent bribes” (p.174). With a lack of integrity absent in ports such as 
the aforementioned, deterrence becomes less probable. 
 The previous threats represent the multiple approaches available to those aspiring to 
infiltrate and exploit containerized cargo. More so, this myriad of threats makes facilitating an 
effective security fabric complicated. Therefore, this responsibility is shared between a collection 
of agencies. Now, while there are some agencies that carry most of the burden, additional 
agencies frequently cooperate. 
Agencies Responsible for Security 
United States Coast Guard (USCG)/Customs Border Protection (CBP) 
 The two main agencies responsible for maritime security are the U.S. Coast Guard and 
Customs and Border Protection. A key challenge for U.S. security analysts and policy makers is 
prioritizing the nation’s maritime security activities among a virtually unlimited number of 
potential attack scenarios (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2007). The USCG is 
responsible for protecting, among other things, U.S. economic and security interests in any 
maritime region (GAO, 2010a). Whereas, U.S. CBP is responsible for keeping terrorists and their 
weapons out of the United States, securing and facilitating trade, and cargo container security 
(GAO, 2010a). However, Wright (2007) found that as the significance of port security increases, 
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so does the involvement of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. U.S. Congressional 
Research Service (2007) supported Wright’s claim by stating, “The USCG, the U.S. Navy, and 
other federal agencies conduct ongoing port security training exercises domestically and 
overseas” (p.8).
 However, the USCG and CBP do have limitations. GAO (2011) noted the Coast Guard is 
limited in the degree to which it can bring about improvements abroad when security is 
substandard, in part because its activities are limited by conditions set by host nations. In 
comparison, in October 2007, Coast Guard officials stated that there is reluctance by certain 
countries to allow the Coast Guard to visit their ports due to concerns over sovereignty. Also, the 
Coast Guard lacks the resources to assist poorer countries (GAO, 2010a). Therefore, in order to 
mitigate these challenges GAO (2010c) explained that officials have worked with other federal 
agencies and international organizations to secure funding for training and assistance to countries 
that need to strengthen port security efforts. 
 Additionally, GAO (2010c) stated that CBP has made progress in working with the SFI 
ports to scan U.S.-bound cargo containers; but because of challenges implementing scanning 
operations, such as equipment breakdowns, the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound 
cargo containers remains largely unproven. This statement hinders the supportive nature that is 
needed in order to overcome 100% scans and similar obstacles.
Seaports of the Study 
Port of Tampa, Florida 
An economic impact study, based on 2005 activity, concluded that the Port of Tampa 
impacted virtually all industries in the Tampa Bay region (“Tampa Port Authority,” 2011). The 
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port contributes nearly $8 billion to Tampa Bay’s economy and is responsible for almost 100,000 
direct and indirect jobs (“Tampa Port Authority,” 2011). In 2009, the Port of Tampa handled 
36,703,639 short tons of cargo along with 48,788 TEUs (“Tampa Port Authority,” 2011). The 
Port of Tampa is Florida’s largest port and largest cargo tonnage port (“Tampa Port Authority,” 
2011). In addition, the Port of Tampa is one of the world’s largest premier fertilizer ports 
(“Tampa Port Authority,” 2011). 
Port of Mobile, Alabama 
The port of Mobile is the only deep-water port in Alabama, and was the 9th largest 
by tonnage in the nation in 2008. In 2010, the port of Mobile handled 23.4 million mons of cargo 
(“Alabama State Port,” 2011). In addition, the port of Mobile dealt with 120,603 TEUs. The Port 
of Mobile imports: Heavy Lift & Oversized Cargo, Containers Coal, Aluminum, Iron, Steel, 
Copper, Lumber, Wood pulp, Plywood, Fence Posts, Veneers, Roll and Cut Paper, Cement, and 
Chemicals (“Alabama State Port,” 2011). Exports: Heavy Lift & Oversized Cargo, Containers 
Coal, Lumber, Plywood, Wood pulp, OSB, Laminate, Flooring, Roll and Cut Paper, Iron, Steel, 
Frozen Poultry, Soybeans, and Chemicals (“Alabama State Port,” 2011). The port encompasses 
approximately 4 million square feet (“Alabama State Port,” 2011). 
Port of Gulfport, Mississippi 
The Port of Gulfport has gained a solid reputation as the second largest importer of green 
fruit in the United States and the 3rd busiest container port on the US Gulf of Mexico 
(“Mississippi State Port,” 2011). In 2009, the port handled over 2 million tons of cargo, 198,900 
TEU’s and 235 ships. In addition the Port of Gulfport is a bulk, break-bulk and container seaport 
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which encompasses 204 acres, has nearly 6,000 feet of berthing space and averages over 2 
million tons of cargo a year shipping over 200,000 TEU'S (“Mississippi State Port,” 2011).  
Port of New Orleans, Louisiana 
The Port of New Orleans is at the center of the world’s busiest port complex – 
Louisiana’s Lower Mississippi River (“Port of New,” 2011). Its proximity to the American 
Midwest via a 14,500-mile inland waterway system, six Class 1 railroads and the interstate 
highway system makes New Orleans the port of choice for the movement of cargoes such as 
steel, rubber, coffee, containers and manufactured goods (“Port of New,” 2011). The Port's 
general cargo volume has averaged 8.6 million tons from 2003 through 2007 (“Port of New,” 
2011).
Port of Galveston, Texas 
In 2009, the Port of Galveston handled only 11,108 TEUs and almost 5,849,777 short 
tons of cargo (“Port of Galveston,” 2011). Furthermore, the Port of Galveston received 788,931 
cruise ship passengers (“Port of Galveston,” 2011). Also, in 2009, their largest import was grains 
totaling 3,037,793 short tons (“Port of Galveston,” 2011).
Port of Miami, Florida 
 Cargo destined for more than 100 countries and 250 ports around the world flow through 
the Port of Miami (“Port of Miami,” 2010).  In 2007, imports totaled some 4.37 million tons and 
exports were 3.46 million tons, totaling 7.84 million annual tons (“Port of Miami,” 2010). 
Among the Port’s top trading partners, China ranked highest for the second year in a row (“Port 
of Miami,” 2010).   Due to its strategic location, last year the port included among its top ten 
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trading partners countries from the Far East, South and Central America, Europe and the 
Caribbean (“Port of Miami,” 2010). 
Port of Houston, Texas 
 The Port of Houston is a 25-mile-long complex of diversified public and private facilities 
located just a few hours' sailing time from the Gulf of Mexico (“Port of Houston,” 2011). The 
port is ranked first in the United States in foreign waterborne tonnage (14 consecutive years); 
first in U.S. imports (19 consecutive years); second in U.S. export tonnage and second in the 
U.S. in total tonnage (19 consecutive years) (“Port of Houston,” 2011). More than 220 million 
tons of cargo moved through the Port of Houston in 2009 (“Port of Houston,” 2011). 
Port of Corpus Christi 
 Strategically located on the western Gulf of Mexico, Port Corpus Christi is the sixth 
largest port in the United States in total tonnage (“Port of Corpus,” 2009). With a straight, 45' 
deep channel, the Port provides quick access to the Gulf, the United States inland waterway 
system and the world beyond (“Port of Corpus,” 2009). The Port delivers outstanding access to 
overland transportation with on-site and direct connections to three Class I railroads and 
uncongested interstate and state highways (“Port of Corpus,” 2009). The Port is protected by a 
state-of-the-art security department and an award-winning Environmental Managment System.  
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Implemented Security Measures 
Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) 
 Officials responsible for security at U.S. seaports have come to the conclusion that 
attaining 100% scans of inbound containers is a formidable objective to achieve. Senator Pat 
Murray, founder of OSC illustrated this by stating, “Container traffic is critical to the health of 
our economy, but we do not know enough about what is in the more than 6 million containers 
that enter our nation each year” (Customs Border  Protection, 2002, p. 1). This awareness has led 
to the belief that container security can be accomplished with the use and implementation of 
contemporary technological assets. In 2002, OSC was created to provide a test-bed for new 
security techniques that have the potential to increase the security of container shipments (CBP, 
2002).
  In comparison Mullet, Palma, Seneviratne and Rodriguez (2004) noted, OSC is a 
federally funded TSA project and collaborative effort between the federal government, business 
interests, and the maritime industry to develop and share the best practices for the safe and 
expeditious movement of containerized cargo. Initially, Congress provided $28 million in 
funding for OSC to improve the security of container shipments through pilot projects involving 
the United States' three largest container ports of entry (Los Angeles/Long Beach, New 
York/New Jersey, and Seattle/Tacoma) (CBP, 2002). Combined, these ports are believed to 
receive the majority of containers that enter United States seaports. 
 A modern approach to accomplish the objectives described in OSC is for seaports to 
move away from primary reliance on a system of control at the borders that lie within U.S. 
jurisdiction and toward point-of-origin controls (National Research Council, 2003). More 
specifically, point-of-origin controls are to be supported by controls developed within 
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international supply chains and accompanied by a concentric series of checks built into the 
system at points of transshipment and at points of arrival (National Research Council, 2003). In 
comparison, the OSC program initiated at the Ports of Tacoma and Seattle in 2004 noted that 
with all the benefits, port officials found that no single project has defined the ultimate solution 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2005). Instead, container security will require a layered 
approach in order to be successful (Department of Homeland Security, 2005). The foundation of 
OSC takes a partnership approach to developing innovative new ways for ports to track and 
protect cargo entering the United States from all over the world (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2005). It is critical for the U.S. to demonstrate due diligence, before a global 
partnership is attainable.  The National Research Council (2003) noted the United States’ world 
trade partners will expect reciprocity and controls on U.S. exports to aid the security of their 
imports.  
 In 2005, The U.S. Office for Domestic Preparedness awarded the ports of Los Angeles 
and Long Beach an additional $6.9 million for OSC Phase III (“Operation Safe Commerce,” 
2005).  Phase III goals included: maintaining and communicating accurate data on cargo; 
verifying that empty containers have not been tampered with before being loaded; verifying that 
cargo loaded into containers are absent threat items; verifying that the integrity of containers is 
not breached in transit (“Operation Safe Commerce,” 2005). This program was able to make 
accurate assessments pertaining to container security and provided valuable recommendations 
that acted as a rubric for subsequent initiatives to follow. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan 
noted OSC has allowed us to understand better the complexity of supply chain security from 
origin to destination, the impact of security technologies and business practices on supply chains, 
and the limits of current technology (“Operation Safe Commerce,” 2005). However, due to the 
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lack of detailed information regarding current status, it seems that OSC has dissolved into 
subsequent initiatives. 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
The primary purpose of CSI is to protect the global trading system and the trade lanes 
between CSI ports and the United States (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2008). In 
addition, Banomyong (2005) agreed, “The purpose of the Container Security Initiative (CSI) is 
to secure what is believed to be the most vulnerable but indispensable link in the global supply 
chain: the ocean going container.” 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (2008) list the 3 core elements as follows: 
1) Identify high-risk containers.  CBP uses automated targeting tools to identify 
containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on advance information and 
strategic intelligence.  
2) Prescreen and evaluate containers before they are shipped.  Containers are screened as 
early in the supply chain as possible, generally at the port of departure. 
 3) Use technology to prescreen high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be done 
rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade.  This technology includes large-
scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices. (p. 1) 
Depending on where you look, there is also a fourth core element: the use of smarter, tamper 
evident containers (“Encyclopedia: Container Security,” 2006, p. 1). However, this element has 
been suspended indefinitely due to certain economic factors, most notably the lack of federal 
funding.  CSI was manifested with the specific intention of utilizing United States customs 
officials. Under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a team of CBP officers is deployed to 
work with host nation counterparts to target all containers that pose a potential threat (CBP, 
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2008, p. 1).  In comparison, GAO (2009a) stated, this program was attempting to further the 
borders of the United States.  Furthermore, by dispensing officials to cooperating seaports 
around the globe, the U.S. government could adequately expedite the inspection process and, in 
turn, alleviate prospective interference with the economy (GAO, 2009a). 
More specifically, depending on the distance to be traveled, every cargo container is 
subjected to and exposed at several links in the supply chain. The risk of a security breach at any 
one of the nodes or links can compromise the security of the entire container transport chain (Lee 
& Whang, 2005). In order to mitigate this risk, Sweet (2006) stated, “CSI asks companies to 
implement automated data screening prior to loading the containers and the manifest rule 
requires that manifest data be submitted to U.S. Customs at least 24 hours before loading of 
cargo in transit to the United States” (p. 174). 
 The utilization of a “no later than” policy ensures that the officials will designate a pre-
determined amount of time to conduct pre-screening. However, given the significant amount of 
cargo containers imported daily, it still seems that more time is needed in order to adequately 
pre-screen all containers before their arrival. Furthermore, United States Congress (2006) passed 
the SAFE Port Act on September 29, 2006, which added strength to CSI by mandating incoming 
cargo to U.S. ports will contain data elements from both the shipper and the carrier. Additionally, 
Bakshi, Flynn and Gans (2009) stated “The program [Automated Targeting System], announced 
in January 2002, uses rules-based software to identify containers bound for the US that are at 
“risk” of being tampered with by terrorists. This software takes intelligence gathered by CBP 
officials and, sequentially, produces a “score” that determines the probability of a container 
transporting contraband. Bakshi et al. (2009) found, a key input to this system is the container's 
shipping manifest, which contains information about the container's sender, recipient, and 
contents. Additionally, once transmitted, manifests are analyzed at CBP's National Targeting 
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Center in Arlington, Virginia, and containers that are identified as suspect are flagged to be 
inspected by the local customs authority at the port or origin, before they are shipped to U.S. 
ports (Bakshi et al., 2009).
 The initial objective was to implement CSI at ports that transport large volumes of cargo 
containers into the United States, in a way that will facilitate detection of potential security 
concerns at their earliest possible opportunity (Roach, 2003). Additionally, McNicholas (2008) 
stated, CSI is now operational at 58 ports in North, Central, and South America; the Caribbean; 
Europe; Africa; the Middle East; and throughout Asia. CSI attempts to take full advantage of the 
current technological framework in order to maintain a proactive stance which will continue to 
reach out to actors in the global supply chain. 
 The most common container inspection devices within seaports are gamma-ray and X-ray 
imaging. Additionally, nonintrusive imaging (NII) technologies play a key role in CBP's layered 
strategy and enable CBP to screen or examine a larger portion of the stream of commercial 
traffic quickly, while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade, cargo, and passengers (Ahern, 
2009). These mechanisms are most typically employed because they provide inspectors with 
proficient images. Imaging technologies utilize electromagnetic radiation to non-invasively 
provide a picture of container contents.  Images are typically created by subjecting containers to 
either gamma-rays or x-rays and measuring transmission of the rays through cargo (Cirincione, 
Cosmas, Low, Peck & Wilds, 2007).  
The advantage with gamma-ray inspection devices is speed. Some studies indicate that 
gamma-ray scanners can inspect up to 30 TEU per hour and that the limiting rate is the speed 
with which images are interpreted, as opposed to 20 TEU per hour for x-ray scanners (Cirincione 
et al., 2007). This process is much too slow to accommodate the likelihood of 100% scans. 
However, another aspect is cost. Most seaports favor gamma-ray scanners because they are 
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considerably less expensive. Comparatively, one gamma-ray scanner costs $1 million, whereas 
x-ray scanners can cost as much as $4.5 million (Cirincione et al., 2007) 
 However, there are disadvantages to using gamma-ray and x-ray technology.  Gamma-
rays’ and x-rays’ provide a picture of the cargo, which then must be interpreted to determine 
whether the image appears dangerous or not (Cirincione et al., 2007). Nevertheless, a skilled 
CBP officer can accurately determine threats with this technology. Yet, making accurate 
decisions can be time consuming. For an officer to determine the threat accurately, he would 
have to compare the image with a picture of the manifest in order to verify they match 
(Cirincione et al., 2007). 
 However, even if the capacity of scanning equipment were to be scaled up (by a factor of 
20-67 per hour) to accommodate 100% scanning, the associated per-container costs would be an 
order of magnitude higher than those required for the Secure Freight Initiative (Industry-centric) 
scheme (Bakshi et al. 2009). Furthermore, the current CSI protocol relies on highly sensitive 
high-energy x-ray radiography to scan containers that are thought to pose a potential threat. This 
is a time-consuming procedure (Bakshi et al. 2009). Given the aforementioned technological 
limitations, guidelines have been established to supplement and accommodate this process. 
24 Hour Rule 
 It is tremendously difficult to facilitate effective container security if all imported 
containers simply came into port unannounced. Advanced warning is a significant factor in the 
application of efficient container security. In addition to CSI there are several internal assets that 
aid this procedure. Customs and Border Protection (2006) explained, “The 24-Hour Rule, 
implemented in January 2003, requires manifest and bill of lading information to be submitted to 
CBP 24 hours in advance of the cargo being loaded on a ship at a foreign port.”  In addition, the 
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24-Hour Rule allows CBP officers to pre-screen and target high-risk shipments and containers 
before they arrive in a United States port (CBP, 2006). The Automated Targeting System (ATS) 
supports the 24 hour rule. Moreover, CBP (2006) stated, in support of the 24-Hour Rule, bill of 
lading information is entered into CBP’s sophisticated automated systems. Furthermore, ATS 
reviews bill of lading information in support of the 24-Hour Rule. Then ATS applies hundreds of 
targeting rules to pre-screen every arriving shipment and assigns a level of risk for terrorism to 
each oceangoing container headed to the United States before it leaves the port of lading (CBP, 
2006).
 However, Bakshi, Flynn and Hans (2009) found that it typically takes several hours, past 
the 24-hour mark, before a request that a container be pulled reaches terminal management. In 
order to mitigate this, DHS established the 96-Hour Advance Notification of Arrival Rule which 
requires submission of detailed crew, cargo, vessel history, and passenger information to DHS’s 
new National Vessel Movement Center. This deadline enables advance boarding of suspect 
vessels well before they reach our shores (Babul, 2004).  
 The amount of cargo imported to the United States seriously complicates the inspection 
process. Given the volume of people and goods seeking entry into the United States every year, it 
is impractical to physically inspect every person or shipment that arrives at a U.S. port of entry 
(U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2009, p. 12). Cooperation within the global supply chain 
could alleviate a significant amount of strain. More specifically, unilateral global cooperation 
would create an aspect of layered security which would make it much more difficult for 
criminals and terrorists to penetrate.  
 Nelson Cabrera (2010) of Lily and Associates found the 24 hour rule will apply to any 
shipment landing at a European port for inland destination. Transshipment and freight aboard the 
vessel will also be subject to rule restrictions. This 24 hour notification rule is very similar to the 
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U.S. Customs 24 hour rule, which has been in effect since 2002 (Cabrera, 2010). However, in the 
U.S., there is only one regulatory agency overseeing and enforcing the rule. The European 
Commission 24 hour rule documentation will be reported to and enforced by 27 different EU 
countries (Cabrera, 2010). Nevertheless, this attempt shows the growing support of the global 
community. As a result, future endeavors should be more successful. 
Automated Targeting System (ATS) 
 Utilizing an intelligence approach to container security can significantly benefit container 
security. Furthermore, taking advantage of intelligence gathering and subsequent dissemination 
seems the most viable option when considering a prolonged security technique. CBP currently 
adjusts the Automated Targeting System (ATS) based on intelligence information it receives and 
has initiated a process to track suggestions submitted by CBP targeting officers at the seaports 
for modifying ATS (GAO, 2006). The calculations within ATS take the guess-work out of 
locating high risk containers.
 In addition,  GAO (2007) explained, “ATS is a complex mathematical model that uses 
weighted rules that assign a risk score to each arriving shipment based on shipping information 
(e.g., manifests, bills of lading, and entry data).”  However, depending on the score received 
from the automated targeting system, potential cargo that could be marked as “high risk” may be 
overlooked (GAO, 2007). These security initiatives are interdependent upon one another. In 
order for the overall container security paradigm to successfully deter threats, all other initiatives 
must operate proficiently with one another. Without having the most accurate ATS score, in-
bound goods transiting the United States pose a potential security threat because higher-risk 
cargo may not be identified for inspection at the port of arrival (GAO, 2007, p. 24). 
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 Surprisingly, GAO’s (2006) research found, “CBP does not yet have a comprehensive, 
integrated system in place to analyze security inspection results and incorporate them into ATS.” 
More so, ATS (2007)  stated, “The current port security regime is a “house of cards,” in which 
containers are often not inspected and the government does not truly know which containers are 
high risk"(p.2). The previous statement alludes to the fact that a collaborative and cooperative 
effort is needed in order to facilitate effective container security. Without the cooperation of all 
port associates, both international and domestic, the container security paradigm will continue to 
be less effective. Furthermore, more resources are needed. Current staffing shortages at foreign 
seaports participating in CSI are resulting in thirty-five percent of high risk containers not being 
inspected before they are shipped to the U.S. (ATS, 2007). 
 In response to a 2004 recommendation that CBP initiate an external peer review of ATS, 
CBP contracted with a consulting firm to evaluate CBP’s targeting methodology and recommend 
improvements (GAO, 2006). The contractor’s final report, issued in April 2005, found and 
identified many strengths in the ATS targeting methodology, such as a very capable and highly 
dedicated team and the application of a layered approach to targeting (GAO, 2006). In addition, 
Pinto and Rabadi (2008) explained, data gathered on U.S. import containers will be encrypted 
and transmitted in near real time to the CBP’s National Targeting Center, where it will be 
combined with other data, to improve the risk scoring for targeting high-risk containers. Ergo, 
one of the most significant advantages associated with ATS is its ability to take the intelligence 
from cooperating agencies and integrate with the current operating system.  
 For example, GAO (2006) noted that CBP’s Office of Intelligence (OINT) is responsible 
for acquiring, reviewing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. Furthermore, OINT officials 
mentioned they receive information from the intelligence community, which includes federal 
agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (GAO, 
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2006). Furthermore, according to OINT officials, OINT disseminates information to CBP’s 
offices at the seaports to, among other things, support these offices’ targeting efforts related to 
cargo containers (GAO, 2006). This ability makes ATS extremely flexible and versatile. In 
addition, CBP officers can also conduct queries or create lookouts in ATS that will search all 
manifest data in the system to identify those containers whose manifest information may match 
or be similar to data contained in the intelligence information (GAO, 2006). 
  Pre-screening cargo is a valuable part in the overall scheme of container security. 
Huzienga (2005) found the vast majority of system alarms encountered by our nation's ports are 
due to naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) alarms, not nuclear material. 
Prescreening can be used to identify which containers have high levels of naturally occurring 
radiation, and hence, each cargo container can be classified as NORM or non-NORM as well as 
high-risk or low-risk. Furthermore, McLay et al. (2008) explained that accurate prescreening 
intelligence is the most important factor for effective screening, particularly when sensors are 
highly dependent, and that sensors with high true alarm rates can mitigate some of the risk 
associated with low prescreening intelligence and sensor dependencies. 
 Nonetheless, it should be noted that recently ATS has expanded its scope. DHS recently 
published a "Notice of Privacy Act system of records" for the Automated Targeting System, 
which it says performs screening of both inbound and outbound cargo, travelers, and 
conveyances (“DHS Announces New,” 2007). This expansion is indicative of the increasing 
threat associated with transportation security. In order for international seaports, both in the 
United States and abroad, to accommodate a higher level of scanning, additional initiatives have 
been created. Such initiatives include the Secure Freight Initiative.
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Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) 
 SFI is an initiative that deploys integrated nuclear detection devices, X-ray or gamma ray 
imaging machines, and container identifying-optical character recognition devices to foreign 
seaports in order to support inspection of U.S. bound containerized cargo (McNicholas, 2008). 
The goal of SFI is to build upon existing port security measures by enhancing the U.S. 
government’s ability to scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials overseas and better 
assess the risk of U.S.-bound containers (GAO, 2008a). Furthermore, data gathered on containers 
bound for the United States in foreign ports participating in the SFI is transmitted in near real-
time to U.S. CBP officers working in overseas ports and to the Department’s National Targeting 
Center (GAO, 2008a).
 DHS developed several overarching initiatives, such as CSI and SFI, to increase the 
likelihood that nuclear and radiological material would be detected, identified, and interdicted 
during shipping (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2009). Comparatively, GAO (2009b) 
stated, “In April 2009, the Secretary determined that CBP would focus deployment of the SFI 
program to foreign locations of strategic importance in a way that will maximize security 
benefits given its limited resources” (p. 7). The importance of obtaining the perspectives of 
officials directly involved with the inspection process is paramount. GAO (2009b) noted that site 
visits were conducted at six of the seven foreign ports that have been involved in the SFI 
program, and spoke with foreign government, CBP, and terminal operator officials during these 
visits.  These ports included: Busan, South Korea; Puerto Cortes, Honduras; Salalah, Oman; 
Southampton, United Kingdom; Hong Kong; and Singapore (Secure Freight Initiative, 2009). 
 As of April 2010, SFI has been operational at five of these seven seaports (GAO, 2010b). 
However, initiating SFI globally still remains a challenge. In October 2009, CBP made progress 
with the SFI ports ability to scan U.S.-bound cargo containers; but the feasibility of scanning 100 
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percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers at over 600 foreign seaports remains largely unproven 
(GAO, 2010c). While CBP works to address the complex challenges the maritime community 
has encountered, the focus now is on determining how to achieve efficient expansion while 
maximizing the security benefit and containing the cost (Ahern, 2009). In order to mitigate these 
challenges CBP and Department of Energy (DOE) have made improvements. CBP and DOE 
have been successful in integrating images of scanned containers onto a single computer screen 
that can be reviewed remotely from the United States (GAO, 2010b). 
 Yet, the obstacle of a cooperative global mission still remains. GAO (2010b) further 
states the SFI ports’ level of participation, in some cases, has been limited in terms of duration 
(e.g., the Port of Hong Kong participated in the program for approximately 16 months) or scope 
(e.g., the Port of Busan, Korea, allowed scanning in one of its eight terminals). In addition, the 
Port of Singapore withdrew its agreement to participate in the SFI program and, as of April 2010, 
the Port of Oman had not begun scanning operations (GAO, 2010c). Furthermore, since the 
inception of the SFI program in October 2007, no participating port has been able to achieve 100 
percent scanning (GAO, 2010c). However, Ahern (2009) stated the lessons learned from the SFI 
deployments in Pakistan, Honduras, Southampton and Hong Kong demonstrate that scanning 
U.S.-bound maritime containers is possible on a limited scale. 
 While the feasibility to attain 100% scan rates at larger ports remains a challenge, the 
smaller ports have been increasingly more successful in recent years. Some of these challenges 
include: safety concerns, logistical problems with containers transferred from rail or other 
vessels, scanning equipment breakdowns, and poor-quality scan images (GAO, 2010c). Scanning 
containers with Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) equipment is generally less time-consuming 
than scanning with other NII equipment. While the actual NII scanning time per container can 
take as little as 20 seconds, depending on the system, the entire inspection time can take longer 
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than 6 minutes (GAO, 2010b). In contrast, it takes 4 to 7 seconds for a tractor trailer to pass 
through a RPM (GAO, 2010b). GAO (2010a) found that, “Based on our review of the 100 
percent scanning requirement, scanning containers with RPMs instead of in combination with 
other NII equipment may be more achievable from a technology, logistics, political, and cost 
standpoint” (p. 15). 
However, there are limitations associated with RPM. Most notably, scanning containers 
with RPMs alone introduces the vulnerability of not detecting shielded nuclear material. 
However, if customs officials believe based on targeting data that further inspections are 
necessary, they can have a container scanned by NII equipment (GAO, 2010b). In addition, 
foreign government officials stated that they are generally not opposed to the use of radiation 
detection equipment, as opposed to the use of NII equipment because it could hinder trade and 
reduce security by consuming a large amount of scarce resources (GAO, 2010b).The 
aforementioned statement reveals the most significant obstacle facing 100% scans. The inherent 
tension between the flow of commerce and the level security makes finding a viable equilibrium 
very challenging. 
 However, given the significant cut-backs and the current direction of our economy, cost 
has become an emerging qualifier as well. Simply put, RPMs are cheaper than NII equipment.  
GAO (2010b) found, the price for polyvinyl toluene monitors—the most common RPM used at 
U.S. seaports—is $425,000 per unit. In contrast, the purchase price for large-scale NII systems 
used by CBP at U.S. seaports is approximately $3 million per system. 
 Finding a way to finance sophisticated equipment such as the gamma-ray and x-ray 
imaging technologies remains a concern. Nevertheless, identifying a solution that requires a 
collective effort could prove to be the best alternative. Comparatively, GAO (2010b) found that 
CBP and DOE have paid the majority of SFI costs for operating the SFI program. Further yet, 
60 
the SAFE Port Act does not address the issue of who is expected to pay the cost of developing, 
maintaining, and using the infrastructure, equipment, and people needed for the 100 percent 
scanning requirement (GAO, 2010c). But implementing the requirement would entail costs 
beyond U.S. government program costs, including those incurred by foreign governments and 
private terminal operators, and could result in higher prices for American consumers (GAO, 
2010a). Stipulations such as the previous emphasize the importance of global favor. Unless 
foreign ports want to contribute, it will be impossible to sustain a security strategy on such a 
larger scale. Furthermore, CBP has not estimated these additional economic costs, though they 
are relevant in assessing the balance between improving security and maintaining trade capacity 
and the flow of cargo (GAO, 2010c).
 Recognizing the challenges to meeting the legislative requirement, DHS expects to grant 
a blanket extension to all foreign ports pursuant to the statute, thus extending the target date for 
compliance with this requirement by 2 years, to July 2014 (GAO, 2011). However, it should be 
noted that the DHS Secretary, Janet Napolitano, announced that the United States is no longer 
going to screen every cargo container before it enters the United States (Homeland Security 
News Wire, 2011). 
Byrd (2008) found:
CBP has decided to focus on high-risk trade corridors in order to maximize the security 
benefit given the limited resources available to all governmental and private sector 
operators in the international supply chain as the most effective strategy to initiate 100% 
scanning. (p. 3) 
Comparatively, GAO (2010c) stated that the Secretary of Homeland Security approved the 
“strategic trade corridor strategy,” an initiative to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers at 
selected foreign ports where CBP believes it will mitigate the greatest risk of WMD entering the 
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United States. In particular, Byrd (2008) claimed that Singapore will not participate in the SFI 
tutorial but they are willing to work together to explore alternative approaches to container 
security. Reluctance to cooperate continues to be container security’s greatest detriment. 
 Although, this strategy is relatively new, progress should be able to be documented and 
utilized in the future. GAO (2010a) stated, “CBP plans to evaluate the usefulness of these 
security measures and consider whether the continuation of scanning operations adds value in 
each of these locations, and potential additional locations that would strategically enhance CBP 
efforts.” However, Assistant Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Department of Energy, David 
Huizenga noted, the SFI deployments in Honduras, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan indicate 
that scanning US-bound maritime containers is possible on a limited scale (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2008). Furthermore, it has been proven that we can effectively integrate data from 
radiation detection equipment and non-intrusive imaging equipment to improve our overall 
detection capability, and that we can take this large amount of data and transmit it near real-time 
to the United States for analysis (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). 
 With all the advantages that SFI established, acquiring 100% container cargo scans 
maintains a challenging task. Therefore, port officials decided to identify high risk areas and 
deploy resources in a strategic manner in order to maximize their efforts. In addition, two 
initiatives were created as auxiliary components for SFI: 1) the Strategic Trade Corridor Strategy 
and 2) Importer Security Filing (10+2). 
Strategic Trade Corridor Strategy 
 The Strategic Trade Corridor Strategy is one of the two initiatives added to the layered 
maritime security approach in order to specifically augment SFI. That being said, the Strategic 
Trade Corridor advancement has become one of the newest additions to the layered approach to 
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container security. In April 2009, the Secretary of DHS endorsed the Strategic Trade Corridor 
Strategy as the path forward for implementing the SFI program (GAO, 2009a). This strategy 
attempts to mitigate the challenges regarding the implementation of 100% scans in the global 
supply chain. The Secretary was presented with three options ranging from implementing SFI at 
70 ports that account for shipping over 90 percent of U.S.-bound containers to seeking repeal of 
the 100 percent scanning requirement (GAO, 2009a). Further, the Strategic Trade Corridor 
Strategy selected by the Secretary focuses cargo container scanning efforts on a limited number 
of ports where CBP has determined SFI will help mitigate the greatest risk of potential WMD 
from entering the United States (GAO, 2009a). Because negotiations are ongoing, details on the 
number of ports involved are not yet finalized (GAO, 2009a). 
 Collaborative efforts made this strategy possible. GAO (2009a) explained, “CBP 
determined which ports were strategic by working with DOE to develop a joint analysis of the 
potential risk of cargo containers from all foreign seaports that ship directly and indirectly to the 
United States.” More specifically, GAO (2009a) added, this analysis focused on issues such as 
known smuggling routes, volume of container traffic, proximity to special nuclear material 
sources, and known presence of terrorist cells operating in the country.
 As stated previously, the approach to effective container security involves a layered 
strategy. There is no panacea that will single-handedly guarantee the absolute security of 
containerized cargo. GAO (2009b) stated, “It is unclear whether DHS intends for the Strategic 
Trade Corridor Strategy to be implemented in lieu of the 100 percent scanning requirement or 
whether it is an initial step towards full implementation at all ports.” However, GAO (2010b) 
explained this strategy may improve container security, but it does not achieve the legislative 
requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers. Furthermore, a plan for full-scale 
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implementation of the statutory requirement by July 2012 is absent because of challenges 
encountered thus far in implementing the SFI program (GAO, 2010b). 
Importer Security Filing (ISF) aka 10+2 
 The second addition to the SFI program was the Importer Security Filing more 
commonly known as 10+2, which was implemented in 2008.  The SAFE Port Act further 
instructed DHS to obtain better data from U.S. importers for container security screening and 
targeting efforts. CBP believes the additional data provided through 10+2 will enhance security 
by improving the targeting process used to identify containers that may pose a risk for terrorism 
(GAO, 2009b). In comparison, the GAO (2010a) explained this program seeks data on U.S. 
imported containerized cargo (prior to the loading of this cargo on ships at foreign ports) for 10 
additional variables and information on ship stowage plans and container status messages from 
shipping lines. Furthermore, Blegen (2009) stated, “This regulation contains what is likely to 
represent the single most significant change in the U.S. import process in at least 15 years. In 
addition, Blegen (2009) noted CBP’s official rationale for the ISF regulation was the information 
required is that which is reasonably necessary to enable high-risk shipments to be identified so as 
to prevent smuggling and ensure cargo safety and security.
 However, it should be noted that although the effective date of the 10+2 rule was January 
26, 2009, the rule allowed for a 1-year flexible enforcement period (GAO, 2010a). Currently, 
ISF is being utilized at seaports throughout the U.S. January 26, 2010 marked the end of the 
flexible enforcement period and with that CBP plans to focus on importers who have not filed 
ISFs for shipments by issuing warning letters and possibly subjecting some of these shipments to 
nonintrusive inspections (GAO, 2010a). 
GAO (2010a) listed the 10 required ISF data elements for U.S. bound cargo as:
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1) Seller: Entity selling or agreeing to sell the goods.  
2) Buyer: Entity to whom the goods are sold or agreed to be sold.  
3) Importer of record number: Assigned number of the entity liable for payment of all 
duties and responsible for meeting all statutory and regulatory requirements incurred as a 
result of importation.  
4) Consignee number: Number assigned to the individual(s) or firm(s) in the United 
States on whose account the merchandise is shipped.  
5) Manufacturer: Entity that last manufactures, assembles, produces, or grows the 
commodity.
6) Ship to party: First deliver-to party scheduled to physically receive the goods after the 
goods have been released from customs custody.  
7) Country of origin: Country of manufacture, production, or growth of the article.
8) Commodity Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States number: Category for 
type of merchandise, as defined by the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, being imported into 
the United States.  
9) Container stuffing location: Physical location(s) where the goods were packed or 
loaded into the container.
10) Consolidator: Entity who loaded the container or arranged for the loading of the 
container. (p. 11) 
The aforementioned criteria are specific for commercial shipping lines which import to the U.S. 
Importers are responsible for submitting data elements for the ISF, and the required data 
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elements differ depending on the cargo’s destination (GAO, 2010a). This inconsistency can lead 
to unfavorable criticism within the supply chain.
 For cargo containers that are transiting the United States but for which the United States 
is not the final destination, the rule requires importers to submit 5 data elements to CBP prior to 
loading (GAO, 2010a). In order for security initiatives to work properly, uniformity must be 
satisfied. Requiring more information from importers inbound to the U.S. as opposed to other 
countries could generate disobedience. 
GAO (2010a) listed the 5 required ISF data variables for in-transit cargo: 
1) Booking party: Entity who initiates the reservation of the cargo space for the shipment.
2) Foreign port of unlading: Port code for the foreign port of unloading at the intended 
final destination.
3) Place of delivery: Foreign location where the carrier’s responsibility for the transport 
of the goods terminates.  
4) Ship to party: First deliver-to party scheduled to physically receive the goods after the 
goods have been released from customs custody.  
5) Commodity Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States number: Category for 
type of merchandise, as defined by the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, being imported into 
the United States. (p. 11) 
 A similar view has been adopted concerning the use of flexibilities within the 
administration of 10+2. GAO (2010a) defines flexibility as a provision (s) that allow importers 
flexibility in the timing and content of submission for certain data elements. This process created 
additional obstacles that CBP was unprepared to sustain. GAO (2010a) found CBP officials 
stated that the decrease in flexibility usage can be primarily attributed to the trade industry’s 
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determination that flexibility use is unnecessary due to the existence of CBP’s standard 
amendment process, which allows filers to update ISF information. 
 Under this standard amendment process, the importer is obligated to provide an amended 
ISF as soon as additional information is discovered or if there are changes to the shipment 
(GAO, 2010a). Nevertheless, providing a single standardized list of ISF variables for U.S. and 
foreign cargo decrease additional paper work and increase the amount of time allotted to 
personnel targeting high risk cargo while encouraging global support. 
 However, CBP is cognizant that global cooperation is the critical factor in order to 
achieve success with initiatives such as 10+2. Nonetheless, permitting importers to utilize 
flexibilities is proof CBP is attempting to alleviate the strain associated with diligent cooperation. 
GAO (2010a) found since the end of the flexible enforcement period, CBP has stated that it has 
been applying a “measured, common sense approach” to enforcement. In addition, CBP collects 
daily information on the ISF compliance of importers’ shipments at each U.S. port to monitor the 
status of ISF implementation, as well as data on vessels arriving in U.S. ports for which carriers 
did not file vessel stow plans (GAO, 2010a). As a result, CBP’s data indicate that in July 2010, 
approximately 80 percent of shipments were ISF compliant, and CBP officials said most carriers 
have submitted vessel stow plans (GAO, 2010a). 
 Attaining global compliance would significantly contribute to effective implementation. 
Some countries are realizing the need for establishing an efficient level of security.  In some 
instances countries are beginning to replicate certain characteristics associated with American 
container security strategies. Blegen (2009) stated the European Union (EU), Japan, and other 
countries are in the process of formulating advance data-related regulatory requirements, with 
implementation dates in some cases already set.  
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 In terms of timing, submission of the ISF to CBP, via one of the two authorized 
electronic systems (Automated Broker Interface or Automated Manifest System), must be done 
no later than 24 hours before the cargo is laden aboard a vessel destined to the US (Blegen, 
2009).  Blegen (2009) explained, “The manifest data is submitted to the US Government’s 
Automated Manifest System (AMS), where it is used to target shipments for inspection by CBP. 
The Automated Broker Interface (ABI) is a component of the U.S. Customs Service's Automated 
Commercial System that permits qualified participants to electronically file required import data 
with Customs (“Automated Broker Interface,” 2009).With the exception of the use of 
international standards-based messaging on a portion of the carrier ISF filings made in the AMS 
system, it appears that ISF messaging is to be based primarily on ABI-specific requirements and 
protocols (Blegen, 2009). Currently, over 96% of all entries filed with Customs are filed through 
ABI (“Automated Broker Interface,” 2009). 
 In general, it should be noted that the progression of security initiatives will be 
consistently modified in order to meet the mutable demands of the seaport security environment. 
There is no doubt that the next year of phased enforcement of the ISF requirements will lead to 
many lessons learned, and continued close scrutiny by international policymakers of the U.S. ISF 
(Blegen, 2009). 
 Collection of the additional cargo information and their incorporation into CBP’s 
Automated Targeting System (ATS) are intended to enhance CBP’s ability to identify high-risk 
shipments and prevent the transportation of potential terrorist weapons into the United States 
(GAO, 2010c). With the advent of more detailed information, personnel will be more capable to 
identify high risk cargo. Specifically, GAO (2010a) noted within ATS, CBP develops 
combinations, or sets, of two rules and assigns numerical weights to the rules in a set to 
determine overall risk scores for particular threats. The proficiency of separate security 
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mechanisms to interconnect information makes overall seaport security more impenetrable. More 
specifically, this strengthens container security. With most of the immediate attention being 
directed at the possibility of containers secreting a WMD, the seaport community is constantly 
preventing other threats. Threats such as piracy, organized crime, and drug-trafficking are just a 
few variables that must be calculated into the overall seaport security equation. 
MegaPorts Initiative/Second Line of Defense 
 The Megaports Initiative reinforces SFI in the overall maritime security approach. U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) in cooperation with the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) elaborated by stating, the Megaports Initiative is a key component of a multi-agency, 
multilayered, defensive network that strengthens the overall capability of partner countries to 
deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in special nuclear and other radioactive materials at 
key international seaports. Furthermore, this program is part of the Office of International 
Material Protection and Cooperation in the U.S. DOE/NNSA (U.S. Department of Energy, 
2010).
 Since the start of the Megaports Initiative in fiscal year 2003, NNSA has completed 
installations of RPM equipment at 27 foreign ports, and implementation is under way at an 
additional 16 foreign ports (GAO, 2010c). In addition, the Megaports Initiative seeks to equip 
100 ports with radiation detection systems by 2016, scanning approximately 50% global 
maritime containerized cargo and over 80% of U.S.-bound container traffic (GAO, 2010b). 
However, the success of this initiative, like the aforementioned initiatives, depends significantly 
on global cooperation. To select key ports for engagement, a Maritime Prioritization Model 
(MPM) was developed to consider both the volume of container traffic at the port and the threat 
level and/or strategic location of the port (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010). The initiative 
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currently extends to 34 ports around the world with work underway at 18 additional ports in 
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa (U.S. Department 
of State, 2010).
 The NNSA has completed installation and testing of radiation detection systems at four 
new ports: Ashdod, Israel; Lisbon, Portugal; Kaohsiung, Taiwan; and Port Klang, Malaysia 
(“Nnsa Megaports Initiative,” 2009). While the deployment of these RPMs to overseas affiliates 
has yet to detect any significant nuclear smuggling activity, there have been other instances 
which presented customs officials with actionable data. Huizenga’s (2008) research concluded 
that in 2003, Georgian border guards, using US-provided portal monitoring equipment at the 
Sadakhlo border crossing with Armenia, detected and seized approximately 173 grams of highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) carried by an Armenian national. More recently, a Megaports RPM 
targeted several Cesium-137 sources which were detected in a container of scrap metal leaving 
Honduras bound for a smelting facility in the Far East (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008).  The 
comments made by Huzienga (2008) are proof that the detection devices responsible for 
interdicting nuclear materials are effective in locating minute quantities. Therefore, similar 
technology could be utilized to target more specific areas of concern within seaports.
 Furthermore, U.S. Department of Energy (2010) found that, “Because of shorter dwell 
times for containers, space constraints, availability of shipping data, and the difficulty of 
identifying chokepoints within the container terminals, capturing transshipments without 
seriously impacting port operations requires new and creative solutions.” Evans (2004) supported 
by explaining that transshipment creates difficulty in commercial cargo tracking, as cargo 
containers may be routed through hubs and then on via spokes to other destination prior to their 
final arrival point. The aforementioned statements, further, emphasizes the need to utilize 
intelligence by proactively collaborating with global affiliates. 
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 Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of Energy (2008) noted the first mobile detection 
platform, a straddle carrier, was deployed at the Port of Freeport in the Bahamas in June 2006 
using both plastic Polyvinyl Toluene (PVT) for primary detection and a spectroscopic detector 
for secondary isotopic identification.  More specifically, NNSA, working in conjunction with the 
terminal operator, Hutchison Port Holdings, has successfully scanned over 730,000 containers at 
Freeport Container Terminal (Huzienga, 2008).  Additionally, U.S. Department of Energy (2010) 
stated NNSA is also evaluating a new mobile platform for scanning transshipped containers on 
the quay at the Port of Salalah, Oman.  Furthermore, the mobile system will increase the number 
of transshipped containers that can be scanned as well as improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the scanning process of transshipped containers with the same efficiency as fixed 
monitors (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010).  
 However, U.S. Department of Energy (2008) noted that if technology is developed to 
scan 100% of US-bound containers with the detection and imaging systems without impacting 
port operations, still, it may not necessarily be a cost-effective risk management strategy to equip 
the 700+ ports that ship directly to the U.S.  This is where the multi-layered approach resurfaces. 
The Megaports Initiative collaborates with CBP where Megaports and CSI overlap to improve 
CSI inspection teams’ ability to identify high-risk U.S.-bound containers (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2010). Yet, identifying a suitable approach to negate or, at least, reduce the cost of such 
an initiative maintains a primary concern. Without bridging the gap between funding and 
initiation, supply chain security will continue to suffer.  
 Nevertheless, U.S. Department of Energy (2008) mentioned one obvious way to address 
the cost of overseas scanning is to encourage cost-sharing with host governments and with 
private industry.  Furthermore, under the Megaports program, we are finding ways to do this 
where we provide equipment and training and the host government is responsible for design, 
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construction and installation costs (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). Without doubt, one of the 
most significant obstacles associated with garnering global support is the cost to start and 
maintain such systems. U.S. Department of Energy (2008) further stated, “I cannot underscore 
enough that SFI or Megaports Initiative implementation cannot be successful without the 
partnership of the host nation, port authority, terminal operators, and other key stakeholders at 
the port” (p.1).  In some instances, this means creating an entirely new platform for port 
authorities which entails significant labor and costs. 
 In addition, U.S. Department of Energy (2010) explained the Megaports Initiative should 
employ cost sharing in the Megaports implementation process. The primary dividend of cost 
sharing is buy-in from the host government and terminal operator. Furthermore, although no set 
formula for cost-sharing is available, the terminal operator or port authority often pays for 
design, construction, engineering, installation, or a combination of those costs. Cost-sharing 
arrangements are site-specific and negotiated differently for each port (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2010). 
 However, U.S. Department of Energy (2010) did state that, under most Megaports 
agreements, DOE/NNSA commits to providing maintenance and training support for three years, 
after which time the partner country takes full responsibility for operating and maintaining the 
systems. This type of unilateral commitment effectively encourages participation. Moreover, the 
Megaports Initiative hosts regional Megaports workshops with partner nations annually or as 
needed to encourage information sharing between regional partners and to exchange lessons 
learned (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010). Inevitably, the success of any single initiative 
requires a cohesive and collaborative framework which promotes information sharing. By 
garnering a favorable relationship with all actors in the global supply chain, the United States 
and contributing nations will be able to effectively establish and maintain adequate container 
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security. Nonetheless, the U.S. has recognized a collective effort between all maritime affiliates 
is mandatory in the overall maritime security framework. Therefore, establishing partnerships 
accordingly can promote a more effective approach. 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). 
 Unilateral agreements are significant to ensure adequate security. By initiating a 
trustworthy bond with all associates involved in maritime security, port officials and personnel 
will be more capable of enforcing container security mechanisms. CBP has taken a lead role in 
working with foreign customs administrations on approaches to standardizing supply chain 
security worldwide (GAO, 2009b). Comparatively, Cheney (2003) announced the U.S. 
government would be, “Enrolling thousands of commercial importers in the Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism program (C-TPAT) to secure the entire supply chain. Under C-
TPAT, private industry partners providing verifiable security information receive preferential 
treatment during the shipping process. In return, C-TPAT members are entitled to various 
benefits—chief among them, a reduced likelihood of scrutiny of their cargo (GAO, 2008b). 
However, Roach (2003) explained, “I should state up front that it is not designed to, nor does it 
in fact, give any particular set of ports exclusive rights to ship containers to US ports” (p. 345). 
Nevertheless, benefits such as the latter are real factors that weigh on the minds of shipping 
companies and any other key stakeholder within the global supply chain. 
Further, GAO, (2008b) noted that prior work on C-TPAT has acknowledged that while 
the C-TPAT program holds promise as part of a maritime security strategy, it has faced 
management and operational challenges. These challenges can equate to secondary and tertiary 
repercussions.  However, weaknesses have been identified with C-TPAT and those companies 
attempting to reap the benefits of this program. Moreover, GAO (2008b) added that there are 
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problems with the portable, personal computer-based data-gathering instruments CBP has 
provided to its security specialists to help ensure that validation information is consistently 
collected, documented, and applied to decisions regarding the awarding of benefits to C-TPAT 
members. 
 If initiatives such as C-TPAT are to become universally adopted, they must be able to 
satisfy time constraints. Furthermore, this success must be predicated on the initiative and 
personnel’s ability to recognize areas where time management can be improved and execute 
accordingly. The inability to make such adjustments widens the gap in effective container 
security. GAO (2008b) concluded while the validation instrument allows specialists an 
opportunity to collect data on the results of members’ audits and inspections of their supply 
chain security practices, CBP does not require security specialists to use these data in validating 
members’ security practices. 
 In effect, by not allowing these validation instruments the opportunity to replace direct 
testing, security specialists are wasting valuable time. When CBP encounters such 
inconsistencies, immediate action should result in order to avoid any further discrepancies. Until 
these collective challenges are corrected, CBP will be unable to assure Congress and others that 
C-TPAT member companies that have been granted reduced scrutiny of their U.S.-bound 
containerized shipments actually employ adequate security practices (GAO, 2008b). 
Unanticipated container delays can cause costly supply-chain disruptions. For example, 
Martonosi et al. (2006) estimates the cost of delay per day to approach 0.5% of the value of a 
container. In comparison to Martonosi et al., Bakshi and Gans’s (2007) claim that when 
inspection-induced delays can be anticipated, the extra pipeline inventory required to 
accommodate delays can be costly. For example, given an annual flow of $423 billion in goods, 
a day of pipeline inventory will, inevitably, be worth only $1.16 billion. Additionally, Bakshi 
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and Gans, (2007) stated improving the risk profile of these containers, CBP can reduce the 
number of containers it needs to inspect and, simultaneously, reduce the overall level of 
terrorism-related risks associated with containers entering the U.S.
 Nevertheless, GAO (2008b) stated that these weaknesses compromised CBP’s ability to 
verify that supply chain security measures, described in security information submitted by 
program members, were accurately reported and followed.  In addition,other challenges with C-
TPAT were identified, including that the program lacked adequate performance measures and a 
human capital plan indicating how CBP intended to develop new staff to meet the program’s 
growing demands (GAO, 2008b). 
 As stated previously, if CBP is unable to ensure that shipping companies are actually 
updating and enforcing implemented security plans, then Congress and other contributors will 
stop allocating support. Therefore, CBP has acted on recommendations to strengthen the security 
validation process by establishing minimum security criteria for the majority of C-TPAT 
members (GAO, 2008b). These criteria are supposed to replace the general security guidelines 
that have contributed to unreliable information. The minimum security criteria for foreign 
manufacturers now state that foreign manufacturers must have written and verifiable processes 
for the selection of business partners including, carriers, other manufacturers, product suppliers 
(GAO, 2008b). C-TPAT and others must garner favorable support from their key stakeholders, 
most notably, the shipping companies and foreign seaports. For many companies, the program’s 
benefits appear to outweigh its costs, and more than 7,000 companies have joined C-TPAT since 
its inception in November, 2001 (Basham 2007).
 To strengthen C-TPAT program management, CBP, among other things, developed a 
human capital plan, implemented a records management system for documenting program 
decisions, and put additional performance measures in place (GAO, 2008b). More specifically, 
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the SAFE Port Act (2006) has mandated a pilot for a third-party audit program. Under this 
scheme, CBP-authorized third-party auditors (with appropriate access rights and training) 
conduct the audit, while the C-TPAT participant itself pays for the audit (Bakshi & Gans, 2007). 
Bakshi and Gans (2007) explained this plan is attractive to CBP for two reasons: 1) CBP is 
falling short of staff required to effectively validate the membership and later audit firms and 2) 
CBP auditors do not have access to certain trade lanes in the international supply chain.  
Firms decide whether or not to join C-TPAT based on their respective costs of 
compliance and the expected congestion costs due to secondary inspection (Bakshi & Gans, 
2007). The latter plays an integral factor in the overall equilibrium of effective security without 
hindering commerce. At the port of debarkation, all containers undergo some form of “passive” 
screening, a non-intrusive inspection which may include neutron and gamma-ray radiation 
monitoring. This is referred to as the primary inspection (Bakshi & Gans, 2007).  Any further 
inspection, or secondary inspection, can include active tests, such as gamma and x-ray 
radiography, and possible devanning of the container for a comprehensive manual inspection 
(Bakshi & Gans, 2007).  
 Secondary inspection is widely considered the obstacle that puts the most strain on the 
equilibrium between security and commerce. A secondary inspection is considered any further 
inspection of the containers cargo after the initial or primary inspection (Bakshi & Gans, 2007). 
The cost to perform secondary screening is a deterministic value based on information collected 
and analyzed by DHS and CBP. It is in part based on salaries paid to the employees hired to 
perform secondary screening (McLay, Lloyd & Niman, 2008).   
 In most cases, the proficiency of detecting WMDs and other forms of contraband can be 
directly related to the personnel operating the equipment. More specifically, maintaining an 
environment that facilitates proper and ethical performance is critical to effective container 
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security. The maritime community has found that monitoring all personnel is challenging. 
However, through the implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credentials 
(TWIC) the maritime community has been able to make progress in assuring their personnel are 
among the most qualified.   
Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC). 
 As defined by DHS, the purpose of the TWIC program is to design and field a common 
credential for all transportation workers across the United States who requires unescorted access 
to secure areas at MTSA-regulated maritime facilities and vessels (GAO, 2011). There is 
legitimate concern that transportation workers will exploit discrepancies within the seaport 
community. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (2010) found in July 2007 
that longshoremen were actively involved in an international conspiracy that involved the 
importation of multiple kilograms and millions of dollars worth of cocaine, heroin, and 
marijuana through the Port of Miami and Port Everglades. Furthermore, the investigation 
revealed six members of the International Longshoremen’s Association were taking cash payoffs 
to smuggle shipments of drugs into South Florida (ICE, 2010). 
 Additionally, Shifrel (2010) found, eight New Jersey longshoremen were busted for 
helping Panamanian drug dealers smuggle more than a ton of cocaine into the country - getting 
$50,000 to $100,000 apiece for their work. Also, The Waterfront Commission of New York 
Harbor (2011) stated on September 13, 2011, former longshoreman Anthony Bell was arrested 
by Detectives from the Waterfront Commission and the Manhattan District Attorney’s Detective 
Squad after presenting forged documents to the Commission in an attempt to be re-instated as a 
longshoreman. 
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 With activity such as the previous occurring on a consistent basis, there is, undoubtedly, a 
real concern that seaport personnel could allow a WMD to penetrate security. In most instances, 
the cash payoffs that seaport personnel accept to smuggle contraband, is a guarantee that the 
contents of the packages are not known. Therefore, seaport personnel could unknowingly 
transport the components capable of manufacturing a WMD, dirty bomb, etc. Most importantly, 
the probability that a cargo container is a threat is assessed by these personnel and within the 
DHS based on the perceived threat level. (McLay et al., 2008).
  As mentioned throughout this research, personnel are inherently connected with 
technology and the process of container security. If either is absent, security will be ineffective. 
Potential for infiltration into the seaport through more direct means also poses a problem. In 
Close’s (2009) study she explained, “Biometric identification procedures for individuals having 
access to secure areas in port facilities are important tools to deter and prevent port cargo crimes, 
smuggling, and terrorist actions” (p. 1). This factor is significant. In comparison, Lake et al. 
(2005) said, “Intermediaries such as buying agents and freight forwarders are the most frequently 
utilized intermediaries between the originating shipper and the ocean carrier” (p. 13). In Close’s 
(2009) study she further stated, “An individual who does not hold a TWIC must obtain 
permission from the owner or operator to gain escorted access to secure areas” (p. 17).
 The constant distribution and transfer of cargo containers makes this process susceptible 
to tampering. Lake et al. (2005) explained it is important to note that there are in reality two sets 
of actors involved: those who hold what could be termed as documentary custody, the people in 
the offices who handle the paperwork side of the transaction; and those actors who have physical
custody. Unethical behavior in either position can have detrimental effect. 
 TWIC holder eligibility consists of two key components: 1) enrollment and 2) back-
ground checking. GAO (2011) stated, “Transportation workers are enrolled by providing 
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biographic information, such as name, date of birth, and address, and proof of identity 
documents, and then being photographed and fingerprinted at enrollment centers by trusted 
agents.” In addition, GAO (2011) noted TSA conducts background checks on each worker who 
applies for a TWIC to ensure that individuals who enroll do not pose a security risk to the United 
States. Moreover, a worker’s potential link to terrorism, criminal history, immigration status, and 
mental capacity are considered as part of the security threat assessment. Further, these back 
ground checks are broken down into two levels: 1) first level: initial automated background 
checking and 2) second level review: TSA adjudication center review. As a result of these checks 
the Maritime Security Council stated that 1,158 applicants were denied cards because of their 
criminal histories or immigration status. In addition, several were disqualified because they were 
on terror watch lists (“Hundreds of Millions,” 2011). 
 However, GAO (2011) found the number of TWICs provided to applicants with specific 
criminal offenses not defined as disqualifying offenses, as of September 8, 2010, the agency 
reported 460,786 cases where the applicant was approved, but had a criminal record based on the 
results from the FBI.  More specifically, this statistic represented approximately 27 percent of 
individuals approved for a TWIC at the time (GAO, 2011). 
 When enforcing the use of TWICs there must be a system in place that will validate 
proper administration. The Maritime Security Council found that, undercover government 
investigators were able to get into major U.S. seaports — at one point driving a vehicle 
containing a simulated explosive — by flashing counterfeit or fraudulently obtained port 
“credentials” to security officials (“Hundreds of Millions,” 2011). Gaining access to fake 
credentials is a relatively simple task. Approaches for inspecting TWICs using biometric readers 
at individual facilities and vessels across the nation are being considered as part of a pilot but are 
not yet required (GAO, 2011). Nevertheless, the aforementioned evidence is proof of a necessary 
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and hasty solution. However, this weakness has been targeted by CBP and USCG and 
appropriate action is underway. 
 GAO’s (2011) research found the Coast Guard’s primary means of verification is shifting 
toward the use of biometric handheld readers with the continued deployment of readers to each 
of its sectors. In addition, as of December 21, 2010, the Coast Guard reports to have deployed 
biometric handheld readers to all of its 35 Sectors and 16 Marine Safety Units (GAO, 2011).Yet, 
this attention still renders concern. The Maritime Security Council stated the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) mentioned the program does not provide reasonable assurance that 
only qualified people get the credentials (“Hundreds of Millions,” 2011). In tests, investigators 
got into ports using counterfeit TWICs or authentic TWICs acquired through fraudulent means, 
and by stating false reasons for needing access. Further, GAO’s (2011) research stated even if an 
individual presents an authentic TWIC acquired through fraudulent means, the cardholder is 
deemed not to be a security threat to the maritime environment because the cardholder is 
presumed to have met TWIC-related qualifications during a background check.
 As stated throughout this research, personnel are responsible for the ultimate decision to 
stop and administer secondary inspections. Publicover (1999) found, “The majority of cargo loss 
claims involve cargo taken from transportation facilities by personnel authorized to be there and 
on vehicles controlled or similarly authorized by management. If the seaport community is 
dependent on untrustworthy and unqualified candidates to provide essential security procedures, 
then the multi-layered security framework can’t be expected to operate effectively.  
The Consumer and Security 
 Thibault et al. (2006) stated that, “Terrorists, if successful in these types of [seaport] 
attacks, could claim a major victory as their efforts would not only harm the U.S. but also disrupt 
80 
the global economy”(p. 1). However, the price of security has begun to take its toll. Maritime 
security and, more specifically, container security have prompted the transfer of security 
expenses to the consumer. This transfer is directly related to the level of security being enforced 
upon the majority stakeholders (i.e. commercial shipping companies, seaports, insurance 
companies, etc.). Extraneous but necessary fees incurred through security initiatives have 
encouraged majority stakeholders to raise the cost of shipping. Respectively, compiled cost 
figures from industry and press reports suggest an average security charge of $6 per shipped 
container, as opposed to $40 per bill of lading for the 24-hour rule (Bichou, 2008). 
 Further complicating issues is the desire to attain 100% scans on all containers entering 
the U.S. This issue, while significant, has been viewed as unachievable. Alternative methods 
must be emplaced if consumers desire to resist increasing distributor pricing. Validating this 
point, in 2011, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that the United States is no longer 
going to screen every cargo container before it enters the United States (Homeland Security 
News, 2011). Efficient container security will depend on several security initiatives as well as 
cooperation throughout the global supply chain. Napolitano noted that rather than scanning all 
cargo containers, DHS prefers a “layered approach” that includes increased cooperation between 
countries and better intelligence sharing and analysis in addition to screening some containers 
(Homeland Security News, 2011). Furthermore, she explained, “I think what we have learnt over 
time is that there are many different ways to achieve a security objective, you have to have 
multiple layers that operate effectively” (p. 1). 
 Without proper action consumer pricing will continue to increase. Furthermore, certain 
areas have been targeted that would augment security while decreasing risk to the consumer. 
Bakshi et al. (2007) found if there is limited scanning and radiation detection capacity, the delays 
resulting from waiting in inspection queues could require containers to sit idle at ports for 
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durations that are longer than required in the absence of inspections. More specifically, these 
extra delays would lead to increases in transportation lead times, resulting in higher inventory 
levels in supply chains, and ultimately in higher cost for consumers (Bakshi et al., 2007). 
  Another area of concern is the off-loading process from ship to terminal. The need to 
divert containers from their usual movements within port terminals, redirecting them through a 
centrally-managed government inspection facility, has the potential to engender significant 
terminal congestion (Bakshi et al., 2007). Decreases in terminal efficiency, along with increased 
lead times, would lead to higher consumer costs. (Bakshi et al., 2007). In addition, Erik Rabjerg 
Nielsen, the director and head of operations and deployment for Maersk Line, announced in May 
2011 that the company will add further surcharges to cover increased security costs (Pelton, 
2011). Reason being, the Maersk Line expected its piracy-related costs to double in 2011 to $200 
million in order to cover insurance premiums, hardship allowances and the rerouting of vessels 
away from high-risk zones in the region (Pelton, 2011). 
 In order for majority stakeholders to compensate for the fees accumulated through the 
shipping process, higher pricing is eminent. However, in a highly disintegrated and fragmented 
maritime and logistics industry, there is no guarantee that additional security charges accurately 
reflect the true incremental costs incurred by each operator, including ports (Bichou, 2008). 
Standard practices in the industry suggest that market players try to generate extra profits by 
transferring costs to each other (Evers and Johnson, 2000; Fung et. al, 2003), and there is already 
evidence of similar practices in the recovering of security costs by the port industry (Bichou, 
2008). Finding a solution that promotes effective security, while decreasing pricing would be 
beneficial to all parties involved.
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Summary 
 Understanding the threats that affect the seaport community and, more specifically, 
containerized cargo provide seaport officials with knowledge that will make it possible to 
improve current security limitations. The effects of current implemented security measures are 
difficult to gauge. There have been numerous qualitative and quantitative studies conducted on 
single aspects concerning the maritime industry. Nevertheless, there seems to be a lack of 
research relating to the perception of effectiveness in the maritime security industry as obsersved 
by deputy port directors and their designees. 
 Understanding the successes and faults of security measures utilized by various seaports 
could enable port deputy directors of operations and security to analyze and assess cargo more 
effectively. Research has determined several security techniques: 1) Container Security 
Initiative, 2) Transportation Worker Information Credentials, 3) Customs Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism, 4) Automated Targeting System, 5) Secure Freight Initiative, 6) Megaports 
Initiative, 7) Importer Security Filing (10+2), 8) 24 hour rule and the 9) Strategic Trade Corridor 
Strategy. In addition, this research has targeted several threats including: 1) piracy, 2) container 
theft, 3) stowaways and 4) terrorism.
 Piracy has emerged and maintained its role as a significant threat to maritime transport. 
While most publicized attacks have occurred in the vicinity of the Gulf of Aden, there has been 
and increasing presence off the coasts of Nigeria, Indonesia and South America. In addition, 
container theft and stowaways remain a concern.  However, the responsible authorities have 
proven effective in locating and deterring these threats. Nevertheless, while all the threats 
identified in this research pose a maritime transportation security risk, terrorism and the potential 
for containers to secrete a WMD pose the most dangerous threat. If CBP and the USCG are 
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unable to identify containers that pose a risk to U.S. national security, then the threat for a 
terrorist attack will increase significantly. 
 The management and facilitation of the security techniques discussed above pose difficult 
challenges for the population in this study.  Therefore, it is essential to gain pertinent information 
regarding the techniques. The more information obtained from the participants, the more likely 
this study will reach a level of saturation that is sufficient. 
  Chapter 3 contains the methodological design to be implemented and descriptions of the 
subjects, instruments, and procedures. The researcher’s rationale for selecting a qualitative 
method is to gather pertinent information by personally interviewing port officials in regards to 
container security. Further, the study’s purpose and research questions are clearly provided for 
the reader. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The literature concerning the perceptions of deputy port directors or their designee is 
relatively new. This study contributed to the research describing the perceptions of deputy 
directors concerning container security techniques. This chapter includes discussion: (a) 
population and sample, (b) methodology, (c) data collection and instrumentation, and (d) data 
analysis.
 The purpose of this qualitative study was to analyze and assess maritime security and the 
perceptions of selected officials and personnel as it pertained to the use of implemented container 
security measures at United States seaports along the Gulf Coast. The limited research required 
more attention to produce a more detailed analysis and subsequent understanding of the 
effectiveness of implemented security measures at seaports.  The research questions guiding this 
study were as follows: 
1. What are the main threats to seaports along the Gulf Coast? 
2. What is the main threat to containers? 




 This study utilized a qualitative approach to interview deputy port directors or designees 
in their natural setting in order to examine their perceptions and that of their designees. The 
deputy directors and designees were selected by contacting seaports of Houston, TX; Corpus 
Christi, TX; Galveston, TX; New Orleans, LA; Gulfport, MS; Mobile, AL; Tampa, FL; and 
Miami, FL via telephone/email. Given the sensitivity of this research, contact was attempted at 
the soonest possible time in order to build rapport with the subjects. These subjects have been 
targeted given their first hand knowledge and potential for a conscientious perspective. Their 
perceptions gave the researcher an alternative viewpoint which will be helpful in analyzing the 
complexities of container security. 
 The data was collected by conducting in-depth telephonic interviews. This technique was 
chosen given the geographic limitations presented to the researcher. Nevertheless, the researcher 
was prepared to conduct face to face in-depth interviews had it been more convenient for the 
subjects identified in this study. In addition, some interviews were conducted via email if 
directed to do so by the selected individual. 
Population and Sample 
 The participants of this qualitative study were selected by non-probability sampling. Non-
probability sampling methods can be useful when descriptive comments about the sample itself 
are desired. Additionally, it is quick, inexpensive and convenient (Berg, 2007). The participants 
were identified utilizing a snow-ball sampling technique. A snow-ball sampling technique “Is a 
non-probability sampling technique that is used by researchers to identify potential subjects in 
studies where subjects are hard to locate” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010). The focus of a snow-ball 
approach is to reach little known or hard to obtain subjects. Further, Bernard and Ryan (2010) 
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indicated the strength of the snow ball approach to be, “The chain referral process allows the 
researcher to reach populations that are difficult to sample when using other sampling methods.” 
 Participants were selected from one population: seaport deputy directors, assistant deputy 
directors, directors of security or their designee from the seaports of Galveston, Miami, Corpus 
Christi, Houston, New Orleans, Gulfport, Mobile, and Tampa. The sample of port officials were 
selected by contacting the Ports of Galveston, Corpus Christi, Houston, Miami, New Orleans, 
Gulfport, Mobile, and Tampa who gave the names of employees currently working during 
December 2011-February 2012. The subjects in this study were preferred given their particular 
knowledge and experience within the seaport community. In some instances the subjects have 
gathered experiences they encountered while serving in or working with the USCG, as well as, 
the CBP or other forms of law enforcement. Generally, there is one deputy director of 
operations/security or designee per seaport. In all there was an anticipated population sample 
amounting to eight individuals. Of those eight individuals, six decided to participate in this 
study. Although, this population is small in number, the background of each participant supplied 
sufficient and detailed data which gave this research and the researcher a thorough and accurate 
context for subsequent analysis.
 The identified subjects provided the researcher with perceptions that were extremely 
particular. The subjects’ work experience gave the researcher and subsequent research a level of 
authenticity which has yet to be studied. All potential participants were selected equitably and in 
accordance with proper procedure. In addition, the risks and benefits were justly distributed in 
order to confirm the participant’s responses without damage or impairment to their credibility. 
When the potential participants were identified, the researcher sent a letter (See Appendix B) 
designed to establish the willingness of the participants to participate in the study. The letter 
asked, “Would you be willing to participate in an interview designed to explore the perceptions 
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of the effectiveness of implemented container security measures at your seaport”.  Individuals 
who returned the letters with affirmative responses were contacted to schedule a date, time, and 
location to participate in an open-ended interview (See Appendix C). 
Due to geographical limitations, the researcher conducted telephonic interviews. 
However, if necessary the researcher would have visited selected seaports in order to 
accommodate the sample population. Telephonic interviews were chosen as the primary 
interview technique based largely on the geographic limitations. However, telephonic interviews 
have other significant advantages. Hagan (2006) stated telephonic interviews can be recorded via 
an inexpensive patch between the telephone and the recording instrument. Furthermore, if a 
digital recorder is used, the interview can later be transcribed in the traditional fashion or 
downloaded into a computer and converted to text (Hagan, 2006). Nevertheless, there are 
disadvantages associated with telephonic interviews. For example, some people have no 
telephone, and others unlisted numbers. In addition, current telephone technology hinders the 
ability for the interviewer and interviewee to use full channels of communication (Hagan, 2006). 
However, the aforementioned disadvantages did not discredit the validity of the responses in this 
research. 
 The sample size in this qualitative study was dictated by very specific criteria. Therefore, 
the sample size was small. In all, eight participants were eligible given the concerns mentioned 
above. Merriam (1998) stated that sample size depends on the questions to be presented, the 
intended data, the analysis, and the available resources to support the study.  Further, Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) suggested sampling until the point of saturation. Bernard and Ryan (2010) 
stated that when a model ceases to provide sufficient incremental improvement within the data 
gathering process, the research has reached a point of saturation. Prior to the interview, an IRB 
approved Informed Consent Form (See Appendix D) was signed digitally and emailed to the 
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researcher by five of the six participants indicating the voluntariness, confidentiality, and risks 
associated with the interview.  In the event that a participant was unable to receive an informed 
consent form, the researcher articulated the form verbatim and secured the participant’s approval 
to notarize the form. The remaining participant gave verbal permission indicating his approval to 
take part in this research. 
Data Collection and Instrumentation 
 All data were collected by the researcher. The researcher has been trained in the ethical 
principles and institutional policies governing human subject research in accordance with the 
Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI). Merriam (1998) indicated that in all forms 
of qualitative research, “The researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and 
analysis… Data is mediated through the human instrument, the researcher, rather than through 
some inanimate inventory, questionnaire, or computer” (p.7). Furthermore, the researcher 
remained objective in order to minimize any attempt to indirectly manipulate the responses. 
Interview guides were developed to explore the seaport deputy director’s perceptions of the 
effectiveness of implemented container security measures at the ports of Galveston, Corpus 
Christi, Houston, Miami, New Orleans, Gulfport, Mobile, and Tampa. For instance, “What, if 
any, factors hinder your seaport’s ability to maintain 100% scans of containerized cargo?” The 
aforementioned question is representative of the type of question that was asked to the 
participant. 
 All participating seaport deputy director’s interviews followed a semi-structured guide 
(See Appendix C) designed to ascertain the perceptions of seaport deputy directors or their 
designees regarding the effectiveness of implemented container security measures. The 
interviewer asked for interviewees to elaborate on certain responses in order to obtain more 
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detailed information. Probing questions, or simply probes, provide interviewers with a way to 
draw out more complete stories from subjects (Berg, 2007). Furthermore, probes frequently ask 
subjects to elaborate on what they have already answered in response to a given question (Berg, 
2007). The telephonic interviews were tape recorded and lasted approximately 30 minutes. The 
recordings were kept in a secure location in order to prevent any outside tampering. The 
recordings were transcribed into a document and formatted accordingly. Additionally, once the 
recordings were transcribed, the recordings were erased as mentioned in the informed consent 
form.   
Data Analysis 
 The research consisted of a qualitative method design to explore the perceptions of 
seaport deputy directors or their designees pertaining to the perceived effectiveness of 
implemented security measures at the ports of Galveston, Corpus Christi, Houston, Miami, New 
Orleans, Gulfport, Mobile, and Tampa. Initially, all the relative forms were completed by the 
researcher and sent to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) to locate certain risks that could have 
been associated with this study. Further, the IRB was provided with information describing how 
confidentiality would be maintained and with a copy of the Informed Consent Form.   
 Approval from Institutional Review Board was received (See Appendix E). Each 
interview, except for interviews via email, was tape recorded and, then, transcribed verbatim by 
the researcher and was checked multiple times to ensure correctness, which provided “the best 
database for analysis” (Merriam, 1998, p.88).  The researcher identified the common themes 
which emerged from the data.  Further, to ensure consistency of analyzing the data, the findings 
were imported into a Microsoft Word document to locate commonalities. The Word document 
enabled the researcher to organize the transcriptions and locate patterns and commonalities. The 
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researcher utilized two observational coding techniques. The first technique, repetitions, 
identified themes by taking notice to the number of times a question reveals a recurrence of 
similar terminology (Berg, 2007). The second technique, similarities and differences, exposed 
themes by comparing how responses are alike or different from preceding or following 
statements (Berg, 2007). 
Summary 
 The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perceptions of seaport deputy 
directors regarding the perceived effectiveness of implemented container security measures at 
the ports Galveston, Corpus Christi, Houston, Miami, New Orleans, Gulfport, Mobile, and 
Tampa. Subsequent to securing the participants, open-ended interviews were conducted, tape 
recorded and transcribed verbatim.  Then the data was imported into a Microsoft Word document 
to organize and easily identify emerging themes.  The collected data revealed the perceptions of 
seaport deputy directors regarding the perceived effectiveness of implemented container security 
measures. 
 While there is significant research concerning the different techniques, there is a lack of 
research as it relates to the perceived effectiveness pertaining to seaport deputy directors and 
their designees. This study represented the first time this sample group has been investigated. 
 Chapter 4 will provide answers to the research questions and interview schedule. 
Furthermore, the answers given by the participants will be interpreted at length in order to give 
the reader a clear and thorough observation of the problems associated with cargo container 
security as well as other obstacles currently hindering total port security. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Restatement of the Research Questions 
 The researcher determined four research questions that would identify the perceived 
effectiveness of containerized cargo security. First, what are the main threats to seaports along 
the Gulf Coast? By targeting the main threats as determined by the selected officials, the 
researcher would be able to better understand how container security was ultimately affected.    
Secondly, what is the main threat to containers? By specifically identifying the main threat to 
containers the researcher would be able to focus and elaborate on the single most important 
aspect that was and is currently hindering container security. Thirdly, how do port security 
administrators and the USCG perceive containerized cargo threats? By gathering the perceptions 
of port security administrators and the USCG, the researcher ascertained the opinions and 
viewpoints of those individuals most involved in facilitating and administering seaport security.
Moreover, the pertinent literature in Chapter 2 has placed emphasis on the significance of 
intelligence in regards to container security. Therefore, this final question is vital to improving 
container security. 
Interpretation of Results & Statements of Significance 
 In all, only six seaport deputy directors or their designees across five states (Texas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida) accepted the researcher’s invitation to participate 
in this study. This sample size can be interpreted as being rather small and insignificant. 
However, these six participants equate to a sample size that is sufficient given that the 
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researcher’s original projected sample size was eight, amounting to a response rate of 75%. Most 
importantly, 100% of the Gulf Coast states were able to participate in this study and give their 
opinions regarding the perceived effectiveness of container security at their respective ports. 
Therefore, with a representation and subsequent interview from all states bordering the Gulf 
Coast, this research study was successful in acquiring the data required to reach a point of 
saturation. The results were extracted from the interview questions by identifying common 
themes. As mentioned in Chapter 3 the two observational coding techniques utilized to extract 
the results were: repetitions and similarities and differences. 
 As previously mentioned, two of the seaports that were identified in previous chapters 
respectfully declined to participate in this research project. The Port of Corpus Christi, TX, deals 
primarily with oil tankers. Initially, the researcher believed that the security techniques at such a 
port would still be beneficial to this research. However, after much deliberation, the researcher 
determined that the insignificant number of containers being transported offered little to the 
research associated with this study. The researcher would still like to state that the deputy 
director at Galveston and the surrounding staff were very accommodating and helpful when 
contacted. Also, the Port of Houston, TX was unable to submit to an interview for legal reasons, 
for further details see the attached email in Appendix F. Nonetheless, the researcher would like 
to state that the initial process leading up to the inability to submit to an interview was very 
accommodating and their demeanor was extremely professional. In addition, one of the 
participants had referred the researcher to a CBP contact affiliated with their respective port. 
However, after exhausting several lines of communication, the CBP official informed me via 
email that he would not be able to participate, for further details see the attached email in 
Appendix G.
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 Taking into consideration the limitations that were mentioned previously in Chapter 3, 
the researcher would like to add that in exactly one instance the questionnaire template was 
emailed to a participant instead of conducting a telephonic interview. The participant requested 
to participate via email. Therefore, the researcher emailed the interview schedule to the 
participant’s designated email address. This did not affect the validity or quality of the answers. 
Moreover, the participants that submitted to answering the interview schedule via telephone 
indicated they were more than willing to participate.  
Interview Question #1: In your opinion, what is the biggest threat(s) facing container 
security? 
First and foremost, it is significant to mention that most of the participants agreed that 
multiple threats were present. However, discerning which threats were more impending than the 
others could be determined based on their knowledge and experience at their respective port. For 
example, one participant stated that, “The biggest threat is “not knowing” what exactly is in the 
contents of a container upon arrival”.  The author informed the participant of initiatives such as 
Importer Security Filing, which are utilized to validate a containers contents throughout the 
transportation process. The trepidation of the participant could be interpreted as doubt in the 
security framework.  Further, the participant mentioned that “It is extremely difficult to open 
every single container”.  Therefore, the ability to be certain of a container’s contents is crucial to 
the overall security process. Another participant stated that, “The possibility of a terrorist 
secreting a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is the biggest threat”.  
 Ultimately, five out of the six (approximately 83%) participants answered that the biggest 
threat facing containers was their ability to be exploited for smuggling purposes. If that statistic 
is coupled with the previous statement concerning the validation of a container’s contents, it 
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should be considered a significant concern. Additionally, three out of the six participants (50%) 
specifically mentioned a concern that a WMD within a container could be successfully smuggled 
into the country. Moreover, another participant stated that, “Securing the supply chain is the 
biggest threat.” If the security of the supply chain itself is seen as a threat, then the ability to 
successfully detect the smuggling of contraband or a WMD becomes less likely. Furthermore, 
one participant (approximately 17%) answered that container theft was the biggest threat facing 
container security. 
Interview Question #2: What security techniques/methods are employed at your seaport to 
accommodate container security?
 Six out of the six participants (100%) answered that their seaports employed a layered 
approach to security. As previously stated in Chapter 2, a layered security approach has been 
determined by numerous security experts to be the most successful security technique.  For 
example, participants mentioned the use of background checks of new shipping companies, 
automated manifest systems checks, the deployment of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at the 
exit gates, security cameras, and port security plans. A participant at one of the larger ports 
specifically mentioned that there was an absence of equipment capable of scanning containers 
upon being offloaded directly from the container ship. This participant stated that, “Now, if CBP 
or DHS had put these devices on the spreader bars of the gantry cranes that off-load the cargo, 
then the crane operator scans a container and gets a reading… he can immediately put the 
container back on the vessel.” Certainly, this would be a significant deterrent, however, there 
would need to be a considerable number of these devices and the need for personnel in order to 
keep this technique from diminishing the efficiency of the container terminal and the eventual 
flow of goods.
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 If a container terminal at a seaport is unable to offload and distribute containers in a 
timely manner, serious monetary repercussions can result. One participant stated that, “If 
containers get held up at your port they can start charging a fee known as demurrage, which 
means I [commercial shipping vessel] came into your port and only expected to be here a day 
and you [the port] did something or failed to do something that kept me here longer.” 
Additionally, the participant stated that, “The shipper can charge the port for keeping them there 
longer than their expected departure time and charges can be significant. We are talking about 
tens of thousands of dollars depending on the size of the ship and the cargo.” Therefore, without 
the appropriate number of devices and personnel it can be inferred that security will be 
compromised at major seaports in order to maintain an efficient and timely distribution process. 
This can diminish the effectiveness of subsequent security and a solution should be identified. 
  Four out of the six participants (approximately 67%) specifically stated that the majority 
of these security techniques/methods are the responsibility of the CBP and USCG. Knowing this, 
it should be possible to establish a more cohesive and enthusiastic security relationship between 
seaport security administrators and CBP and USCG. More specifically, this relationship could 
give seaport security administrators the opportunity to offer their particular knowledge and 
recommend specific areas for security enhancement. In fact, two of the larger ports mentioned 
that they have the cooperation of surrounding local and federal law enforcement agencies. This 
type of collaboration only improves the communication which is necessary to validate the 
subsequent intelligence. 
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Interview Question #3: On average, how many inbound containers receive some form of 
scan/inspection before arrival? 
 Five out of the six participants (approximately 83%) agreed that the number of containers 
being scanned before they arrive at their port was not significant enough to impact security in a 
favorable manner. The other participant (approximately 17%) did not feel comfortable answering 
the question. In addition, two of the six participants (approximately 33%) agreed that the number 
of inbound containers that receive some form of scan/inspection before arrival could easily be 
determined as less than 10-20%, depending on their location and the host country from which 
they receive the majority of their containers. For example, one participant mentioned that the 
majority of the containers at his terminal “Are shipped from Jamaica before arriving at his 
particular port.” At this port, he knows that they have sufficient nonintrusive inspection 
resources capable of sustaining a consistent rate of scan/inspection. Additionally, three out of the 
six participants (50%) did state that this question was better suited for CBP. However, upon 
contact with a CBP affiliate with one these six ports, a decision was made to neglect answering 
such questions. Nevertheless, this affiliate was extremely professional and cooperative. 
Interview Question #4: Where do the majority of containers receive inspection (i.e. at your 
port or before arrival to your port)? 
 Given the figures associated with the previous question, the subsequent statistics should 
be expected. Nevertheless, six of the six participants (100%) answered that the majority of their 
containers receive inspection after arrival at their port. This statistic reveals that there is a 
significant gap in security. Waiting to inspect containers at their destination, even with enough 
state of the art technology, is too late in the supply chain process. Furthermore, this viewpoint is 
shared unanimously by every security expert on the subject. Improving security abroad and, 
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more specifically, the validation of security at the host port would significantly benefit not only 
container security but also total supply chain security in general. 
Interview Question #5: Are you able to scan/inspect all containers upon arrival at your 
seaport? Yes or no? If not, why? 
 Five out of the six participants (approximately 83%) answered that they were not able to 
scan /inspect all of the containers upon arrival at their seaport. One participant (approximately 
17%) stated that he was able to scan all of the incoming containers at his respective port. It is 
significant to mention that the one participant that indicated their port’s ability to conduct 100% 
inspection of all containers was at a considerably smaller port with a significantly smaller 
number of containers. Nevertheless, it has long been known and understood that acquiring 100% 
scans is a formidable challenge. Moreover, without complete and resolute global cooperation, 
such a goal was even more challenging. Five out of the six participants (approximately 83%) did 
indicate that their ports utilized techniques that attempted to mitigate these challenges. One 
example is the use of the ISF also known as 10+2. ISF requires the shipper to provide the port of 
destination with 10 additional variables pertaining to the ship’s stowage plan, container contents, 
etc., that the destination port can use in order to determine the validity and threat of incoming 
containers. 
 In addition, two out of the six participants (approximately 33%) did mention that there 
are two different types of scan: (a) VACIS (gamma ray) and (b) RPM. The other four 
participants (approximately 67%) did not specify the technology that was utilized at their ports. 
Moreover, the participants stated that all containers at their ports are sent through RPMs at the 
exit gates of the port. Yet, the location of the RPMs seems counter-intuitive. If the containers are 
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receiving preliminary security scans at the exit gates, it has become too late to successfully deter 
any threat.  One participant indicated that this type of inspection needs to be conducted when the 
containers are being off-loaded rather than at the exit gates. The participant stated that, “The 
captain of the port could order the offending vessel 25 miles out until they mitigate the problem.” 
However, the participant also mentioned that, “You will get a reading from clay tile, from 
bananas, and you know there are different things where you will get a reading (false positive).” 
These types of readings can be frequent in port and, consequently, strict security decisions could 
cause more harm than good. 
Interview Question #6: Do you believe container security has reached its pinnacle? Yes or 
no?
 Six out of the six participants (100%) answered that container security still had room for 
improvement. Furthermore, they indicated that the current security framework was headed in the 
right direction. 
Interview Question #7: What, if any, factors hinder your seaport’s ability to maintain 
100% scans of containerized cargo? 
 Four out of the six participants (approximately 67%) stated that the misuse of technology 
hinders 100% scans of containerized cargo. For example, a participant stated that, “Had the 
RPMs been attached to the spreaders of the crane that actually off-load the vessels, the process 
would be more effective.”   
 Additionally, two of the six participants (approximately 33%) answered that lack of 
equipment was the main factor hindering security at their seaport.  One of the participants 
explained, “One main problem is the lack of equipment and then the people who are needed to 
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operate it. U.S. Customs does not have an unlimited budget and the mandate required to 
constitute 100% screening, they have to meet a happy medium there.” In comparison the other 
participant stated that, “What hinders most ports is that there is a fixed amount of resources and 
container volume goes up and down.” 
 However, technological inspection/scanning resources, by themselves, will never be able 
to match the volume of containers. Therefore, it is critical to maintain a layered approach, which 
can mitigate the inabilities of a single approach. One participant stated that, “Scanning is only a 
part of the investigative process. The ability to get 100% is an impractical number. Scanning is 
only a part of the tools in their arsenal.” Furthermore, he mentioned that it is the investigative 
and intelligence work at the port of origin which can make sure that the container doesn’t even 
get put on the ship. More specifically, these investigations occur before the ships even leave the 
port of origin. Nevertheless, there are multiple working parts that interdependently determine the 
success of such an approach. Keeping open lines of communication will encourage collaboration. 
Interview Question #8: Would you consider technology to be your greatest asset in your 
ability to maintain efficient container security? If so, which technological advancements 
(i.e. nonintrusive imaging, gamma ray inspection) play a significant role? If not, why?  
 Six of the six participants (100%) answered that technology was the most significant 
asset to maintaining efficient container security. One participant explained that, “The physical 
inspection [of a container] and the teams tasked with this, consisted of about four guys and pretty 
much spending the better part of the day going through the container.” Furthermore, this same 
participant explained, “You can either go four people for every one container or one individual 
per RPM or other mechanisms with ability to screen containers in so many minutes or seconds, 
etc.”
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 In regards to the types of technological advancements, six out of the six participants
(100%) stated that their ports utilized RPMs and the majority of these are positioned at the exit 
gates of the port.  On participant stated that, “CBP and DHS put out an advisement called a 
radiation portal monitor (RPM) and sometimes where and how these things are set up causes me 
a little bit of worry.” As previously stated, in reference to the seventh interview question, 
positioning these devices in an alternative location could improve the effectiveness of container 
inspection. In addition, one participant explained, “The RPM is most prevalent because it’s 
100%, so from there other methods of screening descend from that. If a container went through 
the portal and an indication of a radiation agent was received the next step would be for someone 
to actually go out to the container and physically inspect it with other scanning instruments.” In 
addition, five out of the six participants (approximately 83%) stated that their port did utilize x-
ray technology in order to scan containers. Yet, one participant did mention that, “They 
[containers] do not all get x-rayed but they are scanned for radiation.” Furthermore, only two of 
the six participants (approximately 33%) specifically preferred to utilize some form of gamma 
ray imaging systems like VACIS. However, other participants did mention that CBP would be 
more qualified to answer questions regarding technology employed at the port. 
  Two of the six participants (approximately 33%) mentioned that technology was not the 
only factor to consider. For example, one participant declared, “I believe technology is probably 
the majority of it. Let’s say 60-75% of it. The human element has to click in there too. It’s a 
combination of having the technology and the personnel that know what the technology means.”  
Another participant stated that, “I think technology is a significant part of it, but I also think and 
I’m pretty sure they [CBP] would agree with me, is that intelligence gathering is the most 
significant part in the fight against terrorism.”  Another participant explained that, “Technology 
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such as nonintrusive imaging and gamma ray inspections are an efficient way of maintaining 
container security but human intervention is a valuable tool.” 
Interview Question #9: What is the most significant factor you consider when 
adopting/endorsing a security technique (i.e. Secure Freight Initiative, Container Security 
Initiative, TWIC)? 
 Five out of the six participants (approximately 83%) indicated that they had no power to 
adopt a security technique.  One of the six participants (approximately 17%) indicated that he did 
not feel comfortable answering this question. Furthermore, the five participants explained that 
the aforementioned security techniques are mandated by CBP, USCG or TSA. One participant 
acknowledged, “Basically, we are being told by Customs, ‘we are putting this equipment at your 
port, help us find a place that makes sense’.” The previous statement does reveal that Customs is 
willing to work with and accommodate the seaports in a way that can benefit both parties. 
However, that same participant stated that, “We weren’t given much of a choice and the same 
thing had to do with TWIC, which is really more of a way of identifying these people you are 
allowing into the port.” On the other hand, it seems that the opinion of the participants in this 
case could benefit CBP.  
 In regards to the effectiveness of security techniques and initiatives one participant 
explained that, “I don’t think a “single” initiative is most successful. The initiatives, whether it is 
TWIC, Radiation Portal Monitor initiatives or deployment of additional x-ray machines, they all 
work together to make a more secure environment.”  Furthermore, the participant clarified, “You 
can’t pick one and say that it is the most effective. What you’re trying to create is multiple 
opportunities to locate a threat.” 
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 In regards to TWIC, five out of the six participants (approximately 83%) indicated that 
improvement was needed. One participant acknowledged that these concerns were rooted in the 
inability to confirm the authenticity of the TWIC card. One participant explained that, “One of 
the problems is the card reader itself. There were five pilot ports with these card readers. A lot of 
these machines are not holding up in the maritime environment.” Another participant explained 
that, “The real part of the TWIC card is the reader. And what they want you to be able to do is 
have this reader and the reader gets updated weekly or daily or monthly. I’m not sure if they’ve 
figured that out. They have not got the TWIC reader part figured out yet.” On a different note, 
one participant stated that, “TWIC, on the other hand, looked at terrorism, they didn’t care if you 
were a drug dealer. As a result, fifty-four convicted criminals came back to work at the port 
again.”  
 The inconsistencies associated with TWIC seem perpetual in nature. For example, one 
participant detailed a specific occasion. The participant stated that, “The Master of the vessel had 
an unlimited tonnage master’s license, he had been a U.S. mariner for thirty years, he had a top 
secret clearance from the Navy, he had a military ID card, a TWIC card, merchant mariner’s 
credentials, etc.” The participant went on to explain that, “He wanted to bring his wife on ship 
with him…. according to the Coast Guard rules, we could not let her onto the property without a 
TWIC card.” Furthermore, “The master of the vessel wanted to be able to escort his wife from 
the main gate to the ship and we couldn’t let him do it unless he was designated a TWIC escort. 
It’s harder to get onto a U.S. port facility than it is to get on to a U.S. military base.” 
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Interview Question #10: Would you consider global cooperation essential to improving 
container security? Yes or no? 
 Six out of the six participants (100%) agreed that global cooperation was essential to 
improving the current container security paradigm. One participant explained that, “Yes, 
absolutely and again that is not a call of the port. That is more of a governmental decision. I 
know that the government and DHS are trying to work with these foreign ports and countries in 
order to get the screening done.” That same participant stated that, “They obviously like for the 
foreign ports to say that they have screened 100% of containers but that hasn’t happened yet and 
probably not going to happen. Some foreign entities don’t want to allow inspectors to come 
over.” Furthermore, he mentioned, “That would be a good place to research, ‘why this global 
cooperation is so difficult to achieve’.” Another participant indicated that Customs would be the 
resource to contact, if they would be willing to address this question. On the other hand, one 
participant did offer some insight explaining that, “First of all you have to get the shippers and 
the port to understand what you are trying to accomplish and you have to relate to them what you 
are trying to accomplish, while you are asking them to do what you need to do.” Furthermore, 
this participant elaborated stating, “The next thing is you need interagency cooperation…the 
people on the ground and the people above them need to understand what each one brings to the 
table in regards to assets and resources and use those to the greatest benefit possible.” 
Additionally, the participant explained, “Certainly CBP is the lead on this stuff but they wouldn’t 
be as nearly as successful if they ignored the resources and people that are around them.” 
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Interview Question #11: What agencies (USCG, CBP, local/state authorities) are 
responsible for the majority of your container security? 
  All six participants (100%) indicated that CBP was responsible for the majority, if not 
all, of the container security within their seaports. Furthermore, one participant affirmed that, 
“They [CBP] are the ones scanning the containers, they are the ones targeting containers. They 
are the ones with boots on the ground looking at containers.”  However, another participant did 
indicate that the USCG works with CBP in specific instances. For example, the participant 
referenced in question eight pertaining to the use of teams to physically search containers 
suspected of transporting contraband elaborated on his opinion of the level of cooperation 
exhibited between CBP and USCG. He stated that, “These [physical] inspection teams are either 
USCG or CBP and sometimes both”.  Additionally, the participant stated that, “If for some 
reason intelligence indicated drugs were coming in on some of these banana ships, the USCG 
would probably send a team down here and work with CBP.”  In regards to the intelligence being 
shared the participant also mentioned, “There were issues with the intelligence, there were 
separate agencies that didn’t want to share intelligence.” 
  Also, another participant explained, “If you are a TWIC program and you follow under 
that federal regulation, you have to be TWIC compliant because the USCG will inspect you for 
that.”
Emergent Themes 
 Three themes emerged: 1) technology, 2) cargo theft, and 3) the Panama Canal. As stated 
previously, the participants believed technology was a significant aspect of container security.  In 
most cases they agreed that technology must be constantly critiqued and improved. One 
participant explained, “Technology is a game changer, I’m talking with you now and its 2012, in 
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2015 security can be changed with one advancement in technology. There are “sniffers” that 
sniff the air within a container for contraband, chemicals and compounds.” Advancements such 
as these “sniffers” could improve container inspection times, especially secondary inspections. In 
question eight, one participant stated that physical inspection could “take four agents the better 
part of a day” to inspect and repack a container. With advancements such as an “air sniffer”, 
inspection times could be drastically reduced. Furthermore, this same participant declared, “I 
think as science advances that type of technology becomes more advanced and sniffers could 
have the ability to identify and wider spectrum of materials within a container.” Future research 
should focus on technological advancements. Technology is one of the most significant factors to 
consider when scrutinizing future techniques and, when combined with competent and 
cooperative operators, it can become a true force multiplier. 
 Cargo theft continues to plague the container supply chain industry. One participant 
mentioned, “The port is a highly regulated restricted area, a lot of theft of whole containers or 
part of containers occurs outside the port unless in restricted or secure areas.”Another participant 
agreed and explained that the volume of containers and traffic at his port made container theft a 
significant threat. These statements reveal the need to focus on total supply chain security. In 
addition, maintaining a multi-layered security approach would diminish this threat. However, the 
complications associated with foreign/global cooperation should be considered the main topic of 
discussion in future research. Without complete cooperation such a security technique will 
inevitably be futile.  
 Two of the six participants (approximately 33%) mentioned that the future of the Panama 
Canal should be considered when developing any security recommendations. One participant 
explained that, “The expansion of the Panama Canal in 2014 could have a huge impact on Gulf 
ports. There will be much larger ships moving through the canal. That will have impact on cargo 
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moving into the gulf.” Specifically, this expansion will generate a significant increase in the 
volume of containers being imported to Gulf Coast ports. 
 Additionally, one out of the six participants specifically brought to the researcher’s 
attention the use of the railroad within the seaport environment. The participant stated, “With 
regard to rail at our port we have short rail, in other words, we are called class I carriers and the 
Union Pacific brings rail down to yards outside the port…the short line brings cargo into the 
port.” Elaborating further, the participant explained, “There is a couple things that happen here, 
firstly, we have identified the engineers on these trains, so we know them visually. We have a 
cadre of police officers and they know them that way or they can show us their card from the 
cab.” More specifically, the participant stated, “My concern with the railroad was that there was 
no way I wanted a police officer having to go over to a train and actually inspect the [TWIC] 
card of the engineer before we let him inside the port.”  The participant proposed, “We have to 
do some kind of inspection ahead of time so we know these personnel before opening the gate. 
That’s how it works at these various ports. It is not a good thing for these officers to physically 
inspect cards.” 
Summary 
 The research questions presented in Chapter 3 were answered indirectly through the 
participants’ responses to the interview schedule. The comments and answers, both, provided 
compelling interpretations. The first research question asked “What are the main threats to 
seaports along the Gulf Coast?” The research showed that the main threats were dictated by the 
sheer volume of containers that are imported to seaports along the Gulf Coast and how this 
magnitude hinders the level of container scan and inspection required. The second research 
question asked, “What is the main threat to containers?” The research showed that the main 
threat was a combination of contraband smuggling via cargo containers and container theft. The 
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final research question asked, “How do port security administrators and the USCG perceive 
containerized cargo threats?” The research showed that, both, the administrators and USCG 
share similar perceptions. Their viewpoints endorse the need for more global cooperation and the 
advantages of technology regarding enhanced container security. 
 The interview questions and subsequent answers revealed several distinctions and areas 
that could be targeted to improve the current status of container security. First, the interviews 
identified the susceptibility of cargo containers in regards to the smuggling of contraband and 
theft. More specifically, contraband smuggling and theft were viewed to be the biggest threats 
facing container security. Second, the participants confirmed that a layered security approach 
was currently being utilized at their respective ports. However, they indicated that this approach 
could be more efficient. Third, the number of containers being scanned before arrival to the 
respective Gulf Coast ports was insignificant. Additionally, two of the participants indicated that 
the number was somewhere between 10-20%. Fourth, the interviews indicated that the majority 
of containers were not inspected or scanned until arrival to their respective ports. Fifth, in almost 
all cases it is not possible to scan or inspect 100% of containers. The interviews did reveal that 
one port was capable of attaining 100%. However, this port was considerably smaller than the 
rest of the Gulf Coast ports in this study. Sixthly, the participants specified that the current 
container security paradigm could be improved.  
 The major factor hindering the efficiency of container security is the limited amount of 
resources.  Investigative work and intelligence play an integral role in mitigating the challenges 
of limited equipment and personnel.  The role of technology is regarded as the greatest asset in a 
seaport’s ability to maintain efficient container security. However, the interviews indicated that 
technology alone was insufficient. More specifically, the participants discerned that competent 
personnel were necessary in order to maximize the benefits of technology. The endorsement and 
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adoption of security initiatives is not determined by the seaport. These security decisions are 
mandated by CBP. Furthermore, the interviews indicated that the current status of TWIC needs 
to be improved. Global cooperation is vital to the overall effectiveness of container security. 
Moreover, the advancements in technology such as “air sniffers” could give security facilitators 
an added edge. In conclusion, three themes also emerged: 1) the role of technology, 2) cargo 
theft, and 3) the expansion of the Panama Canal. 
 Chapter 5 will analyze the data collected in Chapter 4. Furthermore, Chapter Five will 
construct conclusions on the current status of container security and make policy 
recommendations that will supplement the deficiencies identified through the interpretation of 
results and, subsequent, analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary and Conclusions 
 There is a wealth of literature concerning the evolution of the shipping container and the 
subsequent revolution that the modern shipping container created for the intermodal supply 
chain. The modern cargo container has cemented itself as the single most advancement 
responsible for the efficiency and increased flow of commerce to date. It is evident, through 
researching the pertinent literature, that the cargo container was innovative and revolutionary for 
commerce and the flow of goods. However, it has also proven to be just as appealing and 
beneficial to those wishing to exploit them in order to cause harm to the United States. Criminals 
and terrorists alike don’t necessarily need to destroy or cripple a U.S. seaport to accomplish this. 
Instead, they could attempt to exploit the integrity of a cargo container and smuggle the 
components capable of improvising a WMD into the U.S. 
 With all the added benefits that the cargo container has generated, the possibility of 
exploitation for smuggling, theft and other criminal activities has become more of a concern. 
While the security initiatives associated with container security have been well documented, the 
views and perceptions of deputy directors of security and their designees in regards to the 
perceived effectiveness of these initiatives have been overlooked.
  The research literature for the topics discussed in Chapter 2, indicates that the deputy 
directors are knowledgeable and aware of the problems they might encounter while securing our 
nation’s seaports. The research revealed that many of the participants were retired from the 
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USCG, law enforcement, or had several tours as the Captain at a U.S. seaport. That being said, 
the majority of this population had been working within the time periods before and after the 
initiation of the container security programs and initiatives discussed in Chapter 2. Their 
professional experience gave the researcher an accurate and honest portrayal of the perceived 
effectiveness of container security and its progress over the years. In addition, they were well 
qualified to clarify and elaborate on any inconsistencies the researcher identified.  
 In order to obtain the results, an interview schedule was developed. The interview 
questions attempted to gather responses that would rate the level of perceived effectiveness of 
current container security as seen by deputy port directors of security or their designee at the 
ports of Houston, TX, Galveston, TX, Corpus Christi, TX, New Orleans, LA, Gulfport, MS, 
Mobile, AL, Tampa, FL, and Miami, FL. This would be achieved through asking basic questions 
concerning the perceived threats to containers, the location of primary inspections, a port’s 
ability to sustain a high rate of container inspections, factors hindering inspection, the role of 
technology, the role of global cooperation, the agencies primarily responsible for container 
security and the factors considered when endorsing a particular security technique. When 
combined, the answers to these questions gave the researcher an accurate assessment of the 
overall perceived effectiveness of container security. Following the completion of the interviews 
it was discovered that containers were threatened by theft, smuggling of contraband such as 
drugs and weapons, and the integrity of a container’s contents.
 The results from this research revealed that the majority of containers are not inspected or 
scanned until they reach U.S. seaports. Also, it was confirmed by the population sample that a 
consistent high rate of container inspections was unattainable. All of the participants confirmed 
the inability of attaining a consistent high rate of scan. Furthermore, it was perceived that the 
misuse of technology could account for the incapability of sustaining a high rate of container 
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inspections, and it was perceived that both technology and global cooperation were essential to 
improving container security. In addition, it was learned that CBP was the primary agency 
responsible for container security and it was perceived that deputy directors of security or their 
designees had little to no influence in the adoption or endorsement of a security initiative. 
According to the findings of the study, deputy directors/designees believe that container security 
could be more effective than it is presently. In other words, these port security officials believe 
container security is inadequate. 
 As mentioned earlier, the study determined that current container security techniques 
could be more effective. However, one participant offered a contrary viewpoint. He explained, 
“This may be a crazy way to measure it, but there has not been an incident in the United States, 
container cargo related.” The participant indicated that the type of incident he was referring to 
would be the use of a container as a vehicle for a WMD or dirty bomb. Nevertheless, there have 
been numerous incidents where containers have been used to transport drugs, weapons, and other 
forms of contraband. For example, In February of 2011, at the port of Miami, customs officials 
targeted a container using x-ray scanning which led to the discovery of nearly two tons of 
marijuana, valued at $7.6 million (Kriel, 2011).  
 It is the author’s opinion that examples such as the one mentioned above solidify the 
point that a container could be compromised in the same fashion to secrete a WMD. In addition 
to the information referenced in Chapter 2, as little as four kilograms of plutonium – about the 
size of a soda can – or three times that amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) can potentially 
be enough for a bomb (Bunn, 2006).  Such a small object could easily be shielded making it 
invisible to X-ray, radiation, or gamma ray inspection.  
 Moreover, it has been proven that criminals target the container transport system. As 
mentioned in earlier chapters, criminals have been utilizing containers since its inception to 
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transport contraband and turn a profit. Therefore, it should be mentioned that a terrorist 
organization may place the same value on the container and subsequent transport. The literature 
along with this study indicates that containers would be an ideal method to facilitate the 
smuggling of a WMD into the U.S. 
   
Discussion of Implications & Recommendations for Future Research 
 In order to determine the perceived effectiveness of cargo container security an interview 
schedule was generated to satisfy the qualitative nature of this study. Among the twelve 
interview questions considering the effectiveness of container security, the questions concerning 
the amount of containers scanned prior to and upon arrival at U.S. seaports, the role of 
technology, the need for global cooperation, and whether container security had reached its 
pinnacle all acted as significant predictors of the feelings shared by the population sample. The 
answers given by the participants revealed several areas for improvement and recommendations 
for future research. 
 It is also the author’s opinion that global cooperation and the correct use of technology 
play an important role in improving the effectiveness of container security and act as a deterrent 
to a cargo container being utilized in a terrorist attack upon the U.S. Six out of the six 
participants agreed that if containers were not pre-inspected or scanned until they reached U.S. 
ports it would, essentially, be too late. Moreover, security initiatives such as CSI were 
specifically created to mitigate these types of challenges. However, without the cooperation of 
the global shipping and port community, container security and subsequent initiatives will be less 
effective.  
 The role of technology is vital for container security to be successful. Specifically, the 
participants claimed that the relationship between technology and port personnel was significant. 
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In some cases, the participants mentioned that even if more scanning instruments were procured, 
competent and highly trained technicians would be required to operate the instruments. When 
probed further regarding the ability to establish more instruments and technicians, the 
participants stated that funding was the main reason for the absence of action. Furthermore, 
given the current status of the economy and the ever increasing debt, it is no surprise that such 
improvements have been neglected. It does seem, however, that in an attempt to mitigate this 
absence, CBP and DHS must do more with fewer resources. It is in the author’s opinion that the 
previous statement explains the placement of RPMs at the exit gates of U.S. seaports.  A new 
solution is needed. 
 One suggestion for future research would be to investigate the inherent relationship 
between technology and the operator. More specifically, determine what factors during port 
personnel training could be manipulated in order to alleviate or eliminate the strain associated 
with this relationship. In addition, explore whether it is possible for technology to accomplish 
more.
 Incorporating nanotechnology into the current container security paradigm could prove to 
be valuable. The use of nanotechnology in the maritime environment isn’t new. Dr. Morton 
Wallach of PEL Associates has developed technology which can readily achieve the goal of 
container security at a low cost. The method is based on smart sensors, a version of which is 
being developed for DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) (Direnzo & Doane, 
2007).  Furthermore, in this approach micro-sensors are designed with surface groups reactive 
with chemicals and biological hazards. On reaction the sensors emit an agent specific color or IR 
signal wirelessly to a control system (Direnzo & Doane, 2007).  
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Furthermore, Direnzo and Doane (2007) stated: 
In the case of a dirty bomb or WMD the sensors are designed with a conductive coating. 
In the presence of such hazards which characteristically emit energetic particles the air in 
the container becomes ionized and on contact with the sensors the conductivity is 
changed in a characteristic manner which is picked up wirelessly by central control 
systems. 
 Regarding the physical application, these sensors would be impregnated on to the surface of a 
thin plastic film which is adhered to the wall of the container. In addition, the cost is “very 
small,” about 3-5 cents per sensor or five dollars per container (Direnzo & Doane, 2007). In 
another application nanotechnology could be used to tag containers for tracking movement from 
truck to ship to dock to truck again, providing a constant “updated position” (Direnzo & Doane, 
2007).
 Perhaps DHS funding could be granted in an attempt to further this research. 
Nanotechnology could even be incorporated into buoy systems, allowing “smart buoys” the 
ability to scan cargo containers aboard commercial shipping vessels. DARPA has already 
provided funding to several organizations in 2012. This includes the Wyss Institute for 
Biologically Inspired Engineering at Harvard University which was granted a $2.6 million 
contract to develop a smart suit that helps improve physical endurance for soldiers in the field 
(Mowatt, 2012). Also, researchers in the Department of Biological Engineering at MIT will 
receive up to $32 million over the next five years to develop a technology platform that will 
mimic human physiological systems in the laboratory (Darpa and Nih, 2012).  
 Nanotechnology presents a great opposition to the myriad of threats converging with 
container security. DARPA funding could equip DHS with the finances required to advance 
technology to an unprecedented level. Futurist technology should be persistently researched and 
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explored in order to combat anticipated threats. More specifically, the advancement of 
technology is even more critical at Gulf Coast ports given the scheduled completion of the 
Panama Canal expansion. In 2014, more containers can be expected to arrive at these ports via 
commercial shipping. Therefore, a sufficient level of security is contingent on the ability of 
technology to accomplish more. 
 All participants emphasized the significance of global cooperation and suggested that 
CBP would be a good place to start for future research. As previously stated in Chapter 4, the 
author contacted a CBP liaison affiliated with one of the major seaports analyzed during this 
study. However, the liaison informed the author via email the unwillingness of his superiors to 
cooperate (See attached email Appendix G).  Nevertheless, the participants unanimously stated 
that CBP is the primary government agency most responsible for container security. Therefore, 
CBP would undoubtedly hold the most pertinent information regarding several of the above 
questions.
 A second suggestion for future research would be to establish a relationship that would 
encourage communication with CBP in regards to the unwillingness of global actors to 
cooperate. CBP could consider this information classified. However, it is the author’s opinion 
that CBP’s apprehension to elaborate on specific questions could lead to complications for future 
researchers. In facilitating the implementation of total port security and, more specifically, 
container security, it is imperative to obtain the perceptions of CBP. It is the author’s opinion 
that applying these perceptions, in addition to the opinions of the participants of this research, 
could prove to be invaluable for further research of container security.
 One out of the six participants informed the researcher that he would be unable to answer 
the question regarding the most significant factor when considering the endorsement of a 
security technique.  So, a third suggestion for future research would be to target and explore the 
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reasoning for such apprehensions. It is possible that other officials share similar concerns. Their 
views are significant to the improvement of container security. Therefore, if similar viewpoints 
are sacrificed at this expense, competent and professional assessments could go unvoiced. 
 A fourth suggestion would be for future research to concentrate on the complications 
associated with interagency communications. If deputy directors and their designees fail in 
establishing an amicable and cooperative relationship with CBP and USCG, there could be a 
decline in the effectiveness of container security. This could possibly result in increased rates for 
the transportation of containers and, therefore, consumers would end up bearing the costs. It is in 
the author’s opinion that the communication between the numerous authorities that operate 
within the seaport, especially in regards to container security, could be more efficient. The 
seaport security climate is constantly changing. Therefore, cohesive, dynamic and immediate 
communication must be achieved in order to diminish threats targeting the seaport environment. 
 Additionally, it is the author’s opinion that intelligence plays a significant role in 
mitigating the challenges of acquiring a high rate of scan or inspection. One of the six 
participants declared that the process of gathering and disseminating actionable intelligence is 
critical to container security. Certainly, cooperation is imperative when attempting to exploit the 
benefits of intelligence. Moreover, cooperation must be attained on a global scale in order for 
this type of solution to function properly. For the abovementioned reasons, it is the author’s 
opinion that global cooperation is the single most critical factor to consider when striving to 
improve container security.   
 With this in mind, a fifth suggestion would be to examine the reasoning behind the 
reluctance in global cooperation. But as one participant put it, “Now with Chavez down in 
Venezuela rattling his sabers as much as he is against the U.S., are the containers checked? No.” 
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So, a simple answer could be that some countries have an unfavorable outlook on the U.S. With 
that being said, reconciling these relations may be the only way to encourage global cooperation.
 A sixth suggestion would be to focus future research on the inherent tension between the 
level of container security and its influence on commerce. That means investigating how 
thorough security can be without negatively affecting the economy. As previously stated in 
Chapter 4, demurrage is a tax that shipping companies can charge a seaport for storing their 
cargo longer than anticipated. If that charge is executed, repercussions will be felt through the 
entire economic cycle. Undoubtedly, this type of action could intimidate the stakeholders tasked 
with administering container security. In order to avoid a significant charge, seaport security 
personnel may sacrifice the level of inspection to meet an expected time schedule. CBP would be 
the initial agency to contact in this regard. 
 The final suggestion for future researchers would be to obtain the opinions of terminal 
operators. Reason being, terminal operators are the individuals tasked with providing the 
physical security of containers once they have arrived at the seaport.  The majority of seaports 
and, more specifically, some of the ports in this study, rent terminal space to terminal operators 
that load and unload large container ships. One participant stated, “We are a landlord port 
authority, we provide a rentable space to terminal operators that bring the ships in and they load 
the ships and put them into their terminals.” Therefore, examining the perceptions of these 
terminal operators would give future research another layer of representative information which 
could be compared with other populations. 
Summary 
 In conclusion, while several areas of improvement have been identified, the author would 
like to acknowledge that the seaport community is a very difficult environment to secure.  With 
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the multitude of threats that frequent this climate, it is important to recognize that all the actors 
associated with container security, especially, CBP have done fine work in diminishing the 
anticipated threat of container exploitation. Nevertheless, improvement should always be 
considered. Individuals wishing to exploit container transport are constantly examining the 
current state of security in an attempt to manipulate weaknesses into their favor. Therefore, 
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Appendix B: Endorsement Letter 
Date: 12/28/11 
Dear_______________
 The security of containerized cargo has remained a significant aspect in the overall 
maritime security perspective. Participation from key administrators would be a valuable 
addition to the enhancement of container security. As part of the continual efforts to advance 
container security, I want to interview security administrators/deputy directors at seaports along 
the Gulf Coast. I believe input from these selected individuals will provide my research with 
acute analysis and assessments. Further, your thoughts could significantly stimulate the progress 
of container security within the global supply chain. 
 Through the Legal Studies Department at the University of Mississippi, I have developed 
a set of questions that I believe will help assess the effectiveness of current containerized 
security techniques. With your cooperation and endorsement, I believe the future of 
containerized security will benefit significantly.  
 The interview process will take approximately 20-30 minutes. After the interview has 
been transcribed, I and my committee will compile the answers and introduce the responses into 
my study. Individual answers will remain confidential. 
I would appreciate your assistance and cooperation. If you have any questions, feel free to 
contact me. 
Sincerely and respectfully, 
William A. Neely, III 
2LT U.S. Army 
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Appendix C: Interview schedule 
1) In your opinion, what is the biggest threat(s) facing container security? 
2) What security techniques/methods are employed at your seaport to accommodate 
container security? 
3) On average, how many inbound containers receive some form of scan/inspection before 
arrival? 
4) Where do the majority of containers receive inspection (i.e. at your port or before arrival 
to your port)? 
5) Are you able to scan/inspect all containers upon arrival at your seaport? Yes or no? If not, 
why?
6) Do you believe container security has reached its pinnacle? Yes or no? 
7) What, if any, factors hinder your seaport’s ability to maintain 100% scans of 
containerized cargo? 
8) Would you consider technology to be your greatest asset in your ability to maintain 
efficient container security? If so, which technological advancements (i.e. nonintrusive 
imaging, gamma ray inspection) play a significant role? If not, why? 
9) What is the most significant factor you consider when adopting/endorsing a security 
technique (i.e. Secure Freight Initiative, Container Security Initiative, TWIC)? 
10) Would you consider global cooperation essential to improving container security? Yes or 
no?
11) What agencies (USCG, CBP, local/state authorities) are responsible for the majority of 
your container security? 
12) Do you have any questions for me? Anything you want to discuss that I haven’t covered 
in my questions? 
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Appendix D: Informed Consent 
Protocol 12-147 
               Date Approved: October 20, 2011 
MODEL CONSENT FORM 
Consent to Participate in an Experimental Study 
Title: Perceived Effectiveness of Container Security at Selected Seaports along the Gulf Coast  
Investigator
William A. Neely, III 
Department of Legal Studies 
203 Odom Hall 
The University of Mississippi 
(662) 915-7902 
Sponsor
Michael P. Wiggington, Ph.D. 
Department of Legal Studies 
203 Odom Hall 
The University of Mississippi 
(662) 915-7902 
Description 
We want to know whether container security at selected seaports is effective in deterring the 
smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), materials to make a dirty bomb, drugs, 
weapons, etc.  In order to answer our question, we are asking you to answer 10 questions.  Each 
question will address a certain aspect of container security implemented at the selected seaport. 
The answers you provide will permit an accurate review of container security effectiveness. 
More specifically, your responses will potentially improve the container security implemented at 
United States seaports, and, ultimately, all ports within the global supply chain. 
Risks and Benefits
We do not think that there are any risks.  There is current research which evaluates the 
effectiveness of container security at seaports. However, research pertaining to your 
expertise/experience is lacking. By providing honest and accurate responses, the seaport 
community will be able to incorporate your answers into an improved security plan. 
Cost and Payments 
The interview will take about half an hour or 30 minutes to finish.  There are no costs for helping 
us with this study.
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Confidentiality 
We will not mention your name at any time before, during, or after this study.  Only the name of 
your seaport will be mentioned within this study.  Therefore, we do not believe that you can be 
identified from or by personal responses attributed to this paper. 
Right to Withdraw 
You do not have to take part in this study.  If you start the study and decide that you do not want 
to finish, all you have to do is to tell William A. Neely, III or Dr. Wiggington in person, by letter, 
or by telephone at the Department of Legal Studies, 203 Odom Hall, The University of 
Mississippi, University, MS 38677, or 915-7902.  Whether or not you choose to participate or to 
withdraw will not affect your standing with the Department of Legal Studies, or with the 
University, and it will not cause you to lose any benefits to which you are entitled.
The researchers may terminate your participation in the study without regard to your consent and 
for any reason, such as protecting your safety and protecting the integrity of the research data.
IRB Approval 
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB).  If you have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a participant of 
research, please contact the IRB at (662) 915-7482. 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the above information.  I have been given a copy of this form.  I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions, and I have received answers.  I consent to participate in the study. 
Signature of Parent/Guardian 
[Remove if no minors are involved.]
Date
Signature of Investigator 
Date
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Appendix E: IRB Approval 
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Appendix F: Disapproval to participate in interview: Houston, TX 
LT. Neely, 
 My apologies for the delay in response to your inquiry.  Unfortunately, we will not be 
able to complete the "interview schedule" you sent due to the nature of the questions.  The 
information you requested constitutes Sensitive Security Information and we are prohibited from 
divulging that information in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1520. Below I have provided a 
general response from the Port Security and Emergency Operations Department.   
 The Port of Houston Authority is committed to continually improving safety and 
security at our facilities and work with our local, state and federal partners to achieve our goals.
These partners include the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, FBI, JTTF 
and ICE to name but a few.  The Port Authority's Port Security and Emergency Operations 
Department employs many different security initiatives and programs such as our Coast Guard 
approved Facility Security Plans, ISO 28000 certification for Security Management Systems, 
Customs -Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) as well as actively participating in 
numerous committees and associations.  The Port Authority has representation in the Area 
Maritime Security Committee and many of its sub-committees, the American Association of Port 
Authorities (AAPA) and its Security Committee, as well as ASIS International.  Utilizing all 
assets available, the Port Authority is constantly evaluating and striving to improve its security 
policies and procedures. 
Please feel free to contact me should you have any further questions. 
Respectfully, 
Mike Ziesemer 
Facility Security Officer 
Port of Houston Authority 
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Appendix G: Disapproval to participate in interview: CBP liaison (Mobile, AL) 
Mr. Neely, 
 Unfortunately, I have not been granted permission to address your questions and my 
requests to our HQ have not been responded to favorably.  I have exhausted several avenues 
within CBP to allow me to respond without success and as such will have to decline your request 
for assistance. 
 I do apologize for the delayed response but had hoped that I might 
persuade someone to allow me to respond. 
 I wish you the best with your project. 
Shawn Polley 
Acting Director, Business Operations Branch 
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